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To the reader
Given that international financial accounting has been an active field in empir-
ical accounting research for decades we know surprisingly little about it. Why
are accounting regimes diÿerent across countries? How do they diÿer? Do
common accounting rules cause common accounting outcomes? Are common
rules desirable? The answers to these fundamental questions are non-trivial.
Every eÿort that helps to solve them step-by-step seems like a good idea.
The dissertation thesis of Timo Eisenschink adds to this literature by providing
three independent but inter-related studies. While the first study collects sys-
tematic data on the heterogeneity of generally accepted accounting principles
(GAAP) across the world, the second paper investigates the reasons for the
international heterogeneity of financial accounting regimes. Finally, the last
project strives to identify the moderating eÿect of enforcement on the IFRS
adoption eÿect on earnings quality.
What impresses me most about these three studies is that, taken together,
they apply a wide range of methods. The author succeeds in using qualita-
tive survey approaches to address descriptive research questions, analytical
modeling to analyze equilibrium outcomes in a rational expectations setting
with asymmetric information and ’mainstream’ archival methods. Of course,
one could start to criticize each and every approach but what I like about
it, is that Timo uses creative research designs to attack central questions in
the area of international financial accounting rather than using some textbook
methodology to address a narrowly defined research question.
The outcome can be labeled as ’gutsy’. We learn that local GAAP regimes
tend to be less fair value oriented than IFRS in all countries that Timo has data
for. We are oÿered an eciency-based explanation for why some jurisdictions
might be leaning more towards fair value accounting than others. And we
see some evidence that enforcement seems to have no robust eÿect on the
earnings quality eÿect of mandatory IFRS adoption. The latter result seems
less surprising if one thinks about whether the empirical notion of ’earnings
quality’ is something that we should expect to be enforced, let alone equally
so, across countries.
Do these answers ultimately settle the questions mentioned above? Of course
not. But they help. Thus, the work of Timo Eisenschink adds to our under-
standing of the heterogeneous worlds of financial accounting. I hope it will be
widely read and used.
Berlin, January 30, 2014
Joachim Gassen
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An introductory summary
Regulators are constantly seeking for information on the consequences
of their activities. Accounting research tries to meet this demand by gener-
ating research output that is useful to regulators (Schipper, 1994; Holthausen
and Watts, 2001; Barth, 2006; Fu¨lbier, Hitz and Sellhorn, 2009; Kothari, Ra-
manna and Skinner, 2010). However, extant accounting research is not able
to suciently meet this demand. For example, Gebhardt (2008: 8), the for-
mer chairman of the Financial Reporting Standards Committee of the Euro-
pean Accounting Association, says that the International Accounting Stan-
dards Board welcomes accounting research, but “unfortunately, they think
that not much of accounting research is really suitable for the purposes of
standard-setters”. To mitigate this concern, the IFRS Foundation (IFRSF)
recently published a new version of the Due Process Handbook which contains
an explicit call for evidence-based accounting research to support regulatory
activities (IFRSF, 2013: Par. 4.6-4.11). In order to assist researchers in per-
forming evidence-based accounting research, Cascino et al. (2013) suggest a
four-stage approach. The first stage comprises descriptive information on the
status quo of properties and associations of existing accounting standards.
The second stage is supposed to establish causal relationships on a theoretical
basis since regulators need to know the cause-eÿect chain of their work. In
the third stage, accounting research needs to empirically test whether these
theoretical predictions are consistent with the existing data. Finally, at the
fourth stage, accounting research should assist regulators in finding partial op-
timal solutions by employing an engineering type of normative analysis (also
Basu, 2012, on that issue). This thesis relates to diÿerent stages of the pro-
posed research program by providing three essays on properties, determinants
and consequences of accounting standards that analyze: (1) the extent of fair
value oriented accounting principles incorporated in local accounting systems,
(2) the underlying institutional characteristics determining the fair value ori-
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entation of accounting systems and (3) earnings quality eÿects of mandatory
IFRS adoption conditional on local enforcement systems.
The first paper ‘Fair Value Orientation of Local GAAP: Evidence from
an Online Survey’ provides descriptive evidence on the fair value orientation of
existing local GAAP systems by surveying the perception of 137 international
accounting academics about the fair value orientation of 28 local GAAP sys-
tems. The survey results enable us to rank countries’ local GAAP systems by
their fair value orientation. We construct a country-level fair value orientation
score based on seven accounting principles: (1) revaluation of intangible assets
to market value, (2) revaluation of property, plant and equipment to market
value, (3) subsequent measurement of trading securities at market value, (4)
subsequent measurement of derivatives at market value, (5) subsequent mea-
surement of other financial assets at market value, (6) impairment-only method
for goodwill and (7) application of the percentage of completion method. The
score ranking shows that Portuguese, Slovenian and Russian GAAP are the
top three and Austrian, German and Italian GAAP are the bottom three of
the fair value orientation. Furthermore, we are able to show that the fair
value orientation of the 2012 version of IFRS is higher than any of the 28 local
GAAP systems.
During the subprime mortgage crisis, accounting regulators came under
politically driven pressure to rethink fair value accounting, in particular mark-
to-model measurement principles (e.g. Forbes, 2008; Wallison, 2008). Prior
literature has not yet reached a consensus on the pros and cons of fair value
accounting (e.g. Landsman, 2007; Penman, 2007; Laux and Leuz, 2009). This
project supports regulators with respect to that debate and in line with the
first step of evidence-based standard setting as it constitutes a foundation of
the global status quo of fair value orientation. Nevertheless, showing descrip-
tive evidence is only a first step in the process of evidence-based standard
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setting. Regulators also need advice on the causal chains of their regulatory
interventions. To suciently establish these chains, research should develop
a theoretical foundation as a second step and subsequently test this theory
empirically in a third step.
The second paper ‘Financial Accounting System Choice when Objectives
Compete’ (joint work with Joachim Gassen) follows this approach and exam-
ines determinants of the fair value orientation of financial accounting systems.
In the first part of the paper, we develop a principal agent model based on
Goldman and Slezak (2006) to give a risk-neutral entrepreneur (principal) who
has an incentive to smooth consumption the opportunity to choose between
two accounting systems. The accounting system is used to solve moral haz-
ard problems with a risk-averse manager who has to run the firm (to provide
ecient contracting) as well as to reduce information asymmetries between
the manager and an exogenous risk-averse capital market (to provide ecient
stock pricing). Although the manager does not know the firm value, she still
decides in the first period on the acceptance of the contract, her eÿort level
and the level of discretion she will exert over the accounting report. The firm
value is based on the eÿort level and the productivity of the manager, internal
production risk and external market risk. After receiving private information
about the firm value, the manager publicly releases a (potentially manipu-
lated) accounting report, which is used by the risk-averse capital market to
determine the stock price. In a next step, the entrepreneur sells some stocks
to smooth consumption and the manager is paid based on the stock price. In
the last period, the firm value is realized and the firm is terminated. The
comparative static results indicate that the preference of the entrepreneur for
a fair value accounting system increases with the relative importance of the
capital market and the outside options of the manager, while it decreases with
the overall quality of the accounting signal, the strength of the enforcement
system and the productivity of the manager.
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In the second part of the paper, we empirically test the predictions of our
analytical model. Confirming the theoretical predictions, the empirical results
show that the relative size of capital markets is positively related to the fair
value orientation of accounting systems and the productivity of the top-level
management is negatively related. In addition, we find weak evidence that
management opportunity cost is negatively related to fair value orientation.
We find no evidence that the level of accounting enforcement is linked to the
fair value orientation.
This project is useful for regulators in the sense of the second and third
step of evidence-based standard setting, since it clarifies the importance of the
institutional environment for the design of an accounting system and therefore
explains the observable variance in international accounting systems. Thus,
regulators should carefully evaluate potential unintentional consequences (for
an overview Bru¨ggemann, Hitz and Sellhorn, 2013) of changing the fair value
orientation of an accounting system conditional on the general institutional
environment. Our paper shows that, for instance, the relative importance of
capital markets gives an eciency-based explanation for the fair value ori-
entation of a given accounting system. Thus, changing this system towards
historical cost as a response to a negative public perception of fair value ac-
counting might result in (additional) ineciencies.
The third paper ‘Mandatory IFRS Adoption, Changes in Enforcement
and Earnings Quality’ investigates whether potential financial reporting ef-
fects of changing an accounting system depend on the eciency of the en-
forcement system. To harmonize financial accounting of European firms, the
European Union requires listed firms to apply IFRS for their consolidated fi-
nancial statements with the beginning of 2005. In addition, the European
Union harmonized institutional oversight enforcement activities of its mem-
ber states. European countries were forced to install an enforcement system
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that ensures a correct application of IFRS. For example, the enforcement sys-
tem should review financial reports on a proactive basis by using a risk-based
approach and should ensure that detected errors will be disclosed. As a con-
sequence, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway and the UK created
new enforcement systems or shifted from a reactive to a proactive enforcement
system whereas other European countries already had an enforcement system
in place that encompasses the required measures.
1
Since prior literature suggests that earnings quality is shaped by ac-
counting standards as well as their enforcement (e.g. Holthausen, 2009; Leuz,
2010), we believe that earnings quality eÿects of mandatory IFRS adoption in
the European Union should vary across these two groups: (1) IFRS adoption
with a strict enforcement system and (2) IFRS adoption and a concurrent shift
from a weak to a strict enforcement system. Using a sample of 24,596 firm-
year observations from 13 EU countries and 14 benchmark countries to control
for general macroeconomic eÿects, we investigate four earnings quality mea-
sures: income smoothing, accrual quality, small positive earnings and timely
loss recognition. We find weak evidence that adopting IFRS with a strict
enforcement system is associated with less income smoothing in comparison
to countries that substantially changed their enforcement system. However,
we are not able to find statistically significant diÿerences between changing
and strict enforcement countries with respect to accrual quality, small positive
earnings and timely loss recognition.
While this project produces null results, it is nevertheless useful for reg-
ulators in the sense that it attempts to relate to the second and third step of
evidence-based standard setting. Although mandatory IFRS adoption is ex-
pected to increase earnings quality (Armstrong et al., 2010), the paper shows
1
Norway is not an European Union member state but belongs to the European Economic
Area. For simplicity, we treat Norway as an European Union member state.
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that this aim is not achieved, even if the accounting changes are strictly en-
forced by an enforcement institution.
Although the thesis does not directly speak to the fourth stage of evidence-
based standard setting, the results can be interpreted as contributing to the last
stage, the regulatory engineering. Accounting systems are supposed to operate
as a single input device in heterogeneous contracting (Ball, 2001). Therefore,
financial reporting systems are usually designed as ‘general purpose systems’
(e.g. IASB Framework: OB.12). This is demanding, as regulators have to
acknowledge claims of various economic agents aÿected by these systems and
hence regulatory interventions might not necessarily result in pareto-superior
solutions. Thus, regulating accounting systems always requires a balancing of
diÿerent partial optimal solutions for various groups. For example, the second
paper oÿers such solutions as it shows that fair value oriented systems are, inter
alia, an ecient response to the importance of capital markets in unregulated
settings. Thus, moving accounting systems towards fair value measurement is,
ceteris paribus, a partial optimal solution for capital market participants. In
the end, it is the responsibility of the regulator to decide whether she wants
to derive this partial optimal solution.
6
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Fair Value Orientation of Local GAAP: Evidence from an Online
Survey
Timo Eisenschink
Abstract: This project investigates the fair value orientation of local GAAP
systems worldwide. Based on survey results from 137 accounting academics
from 28 countries, we present information about the accounting framework
and 17 recognition and measurement principles for each country. We show
for most accounting principles that local GAAP systems are relatively harmo-
nized. However, diÿerences in the cross-country fair value orientation basically
arise from diÿerent subsequent measurement concepts for financial assets and
goodwill. The survey results enable us to rank local GAAP systems by their
fair value orientation. Therefore, we construct a country-level score based on
seven accounting principles. Our results show that Austrian, German and
Italian GAAP have the lowest and Portuguese, Slovenian and Russian GAAP
have the highest fair value orientation. In addition, we are able to show that
all local GAAP systems are less fair value orientated than IFRS, which makes
IFRS the top fair value accounting system worldwide.
Keywords: Local GAAP, Fair Value Orientation, Online Survey
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1 Introduction
In the last twenty years the International Accounting Standards Board
(IASB) and the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) replaced his-
torical cost accounting with fair value accounting for a variety of accounting
transactions (Emerson, Karim and Rutledge, 2010). For example, Interna-
tional Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS, formerly IAS) mandates or al-
lows using fair values for the initial and subsequent measurement of financial
assets, intangibles as well as property, plant and equipment and for impair-
ment purposes.
1
Reasons for the shift towards fair value accounting are the
liberalization of the capital markets worldwide (resulting in an increase of se-
curities liquidity and supposedly new financial products) and the development
of appropriate valuation models (Ball, 2006). However, although fair value
estimates are currently being used more and more, fair value accounting is a
highly debated issue in the financial accounting literature. Proponents argue
that fair value accounting satisfies the information needs of shareholders by
providing decision useful information. Also, in comparison to historical cost
accounting, fair value accounting is assumed to be more directly linked to true
economic performance. Contrarily, opponents argue that if fair values have
to be estimated by the management (mark-to-model), fair value measurement
lacks reliability because it depends on estimation models and managerial judg-
ment. Furthermore, some raise concerns about the use of fair values in times
of a financial crisis or a bubble (see for a discussion about fair value accounting
Landsman, 2007; Penman, 2007; Laux and Leuz, 2009; Barth and Landsman,
2010).
In this context, researchers often highlight the dominant role of fair value
accounting in IFRS and US GAAP and thus implicitly assume that fair value
1
See Cairns (2006) for an overview about the implementation of fair value accounting into
IFRS.
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accounting does not play an important role in other local GAAP systems
(e.g. Benston, Bromwich and Wagenhofer, 2006; Barth, 2008; Botzem and
Quack, 2009; Kothari, Ramanna and Skinner, 2010; Fiechter, 2011). However,
descriptive evidence about the fair value orientation (FVO) of local GAAP
systems worldwide is rare and thus the empirical question to which extent fair
value accounting is incorporated into IFRS (and US GAAP) relative to other
local GAAP systems is open.
We add to this by providing survey-based details on the perception of 137
international accounting academics from 28 countries about the FVO of their
home countries’ local GAAP system that applies to non-financial firms. Fair
value measures are used for a variety of accounting treatments. For example,
fair values are prominently used for the measurement of financial assets, but
goodwill impairment tests require fair value measurements as well. We define
FVO as the extent to which fair values are used in financial accounting. Thus,
we use the term FVO in a broad sense including all treatments in which fair
values are used.
2
We present survey-based details about general characteristics of local
GAAP systems as well as main recognition and measurement principles for
five diÿerent asset classes: (1) intangible assets, (2) goodwill, (3) property,
plant and equipment (PPE), (4) financial assets and (5) long-term contracts.
Our results show that only a few countries allow using fair value accounting
for the subsequent measurement of non-financial assets. Fair value accounting
is primarily used for impairment purposes and the subsequent measurement of
financial assets. We also show that most accounting principles are harmonized
across countries and that diÿerences in the worldwide FVO predominantly
arise from deviations in the subsequent measurement of trading securities and
2
In a narrow sense, FVO solely encompasses the subsequent measurement of assets and
liabilities at fair value.
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derivatives (historical cost versus fair value) as well as in the subsequent mea-
surement of goodwill (amortization method versus impairment-only method).
Relying on the survey results, we are able to rank countries across their
FVO. In doing so, we derive a country-level FVO score (FV OSCORE) based
on the following seven principles: (1) revaluation of intangible assets to market
value, (2) revaluation of PPE to market value, (3) subsequent measurement
of trading securities at market value, (4) subsequent measurement of deriva-
tives at market value, (5) subsequent measurement of other financial assets at
market value, (6) impairment-only method for goodwill and (7) application of
the percentage of completion (PoC) method. Results suggest that Portuguese,
Slovenian and Russian GAAP are the top three, US GAAP are the top four
and Austrian, German and Italian GAAP are the bottom three of the FVO.
Comparing the FV OSCORE with the FVO of the 2012 version of IFRS re-
veals that all local GAAP systems are less fair value oriented than IFRS, which
makes IFRS the top FVO accounting system worldwide. In addition, we use
the survey results to classify local GAAP systems. The classification results
provide information about the harmonization of local GAAP systems and thus
contribute to the current harmonization debate.
This paper continues as follows: Section two presents prior literature. In
section three, we present the survey design and the survey results. Section
four concludes.
2 Prior Literature
Literature on properties of local GAAP systems goes back to the 1970s.
Since then the former audit company Price Waterhouse provides a database for
64 countries about financial accounting recognition, measurement and disclo-
sure treatments using a seven step ordinal scale (Fitzgerald, Stickler andWatts,
1979). Based on this data, various studies examine the beginning of the inter-
12
national accounting convergence process (see for an overview Tay and Parker,
1990). Some years later, the audit company Coopers and Lybrand (1993) is-
sued a detailed summary about the recognition, valuation and disclosure of 20
financial statement items for 37 countries. In the same period, Ordelheide and
KPMG (1995) provide information for 19 developed countries (plus IAS) about
recognition, valuation and disclosure treatments. Basu, Hwang and Jan (1998)
rank ten developed countries across three properties of accounting systems: (1)
the extent of accrual accounting, (2) market value orientation and (3) the level
of accounting choices. Hung (2001) develops an accrual index of eleven ac-
counting treatments for 21 countries based on the Coopers and Lybrand data.
Ashbaugh and Pincus (2001) also use the Coopers and Lybrand overview to
construct a local GAAP score for 13 countries based on diÿerences across eight
disclosure and four measurement principles.
Recent large sample size descriptive evidence is provided by the ‘GAAP
2001’ survey (Nobes, 2001). This study presents deviations of local GAAP to
IAS relating to 80 accounting measures and disclosures for 62 countries.
3
The
survey asks partners from seven big international audit companies to evaluate
how local GAAP systems significantly diÿer from IAS. Relying on the ‘GAAP
2001’ survey three studies construct measures capturing the diÿerence or dis-
tance between IAS and local GAAP systems. Street (2002) summarizes the
‘GAAP 2001’ survey and ranks countries based on the number of total dif-
ferences. Ding et al. (2007) summarize GAAP diÿerences with the variables
absence and divergence. Absence covers whether a specific accounting treat-
ment is regulated in IAS but not in local GAAP. Divergence covers whether
a transaction is treated diÿerently in IAS and local GAAP. Bae, Tan and
3
For example, the ‘GAAP 2001’ survey comprises recognition, measurement and disclosure
principles for financial instruments, provisions, employee benefits, income taxes, business
combinations and related parties.
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Welker (2008) construct a GAAP diÿerences score based on 21 key accounting
items.
Using the ‘GAAP 2001’ survey results has certain limitations for several
reasons. For one, the survey was not designed for academic purposes. Rather,
it aims to serve audit companies as a basis for the argumentation that a high
variance of the quality of local GAAP systems across countries exists and that
correspondingly, low quality GAAP systems are responsible for low quality
financial accounting statements (Nobes, 2009). Also, the survey does not give
deeper insight into accounting treatments, as it solely indicates whether local
accounting rules deviate from IAS without providing further details. Addi-
tionally, deviations of local accounting principles from IAS only reflect one
side of the coin. Equivalent principles or principles that are regulated in local
GAAP but not in IAS are not presented in the survey and thus results are not
comparable across countries. Furthermore, the survey considers local GAAP
systems as of 2001. Over the last 10 years, financial accounting regulation
have faced tremendous changes. We therefore believe that there is a demand
for new insights about properties of local GAAP systems.
This study is closely related to Gassen and Eisenschink (2013). In the
empirical part of their paper, the authors develop three alternative measures
assessing the FVO of local GAAP systems in order to test the theoretical pre-
dictions of their analytical model.
4
The first measure is based on archival firm-
year data of accounting outcome and is the first principal component of five
output-based measures. The second and third measures are input-oriented and
4
In their analytical model Gassen and Eisenschink (2013) let an entrepreneur (principal)
decide between two noisy accounting systems. The first system is labeled as historical cost
while the second (is labeled) as fair value. The accounting system is used for contracting
with a manager (agent) and for communicating the firm value to a risk-averse capital
market. Their comparative static results indicate that the preference of the entrepreneur
for a fair value accounting system increases with the relative importance of the capital
market and the outside options of the manager, while it decreases with the overall quality
of the accounting signal, the strength of the enforcement system and the productivity of
the manager.
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use information from a de jure standpoint. For the second metric, the authors
use practitioner publications supplied by the audit profession to self-assess the
FVO of local GAAP systems for 18 countries. The third measure is based on
the survey results of this study. The authors show that the relative size of the
capital market is positively related to the FVO of local GAAP systems and
the productivity of the top-level management is negatively related. They also
find weak evidence that management opportunity cost is positively related to
the FVO of local GAAP systems. This study diÿers from Gassen and Eisen-
schink (2013) in the respect that we present detailed survey-based results about
general characteristics as well as main recognition and measurement principles
of 28 local GAAP systems. We do not develop a particular theoretical model
to investigate determinants of the FVO of local GAAP systems. Our results
should solely be interpreted in a descriptive manner.
3 Fair Value Orientation of Local GAAP Systems
3.1 Survey Design
To investigate the FVO of local GAAP systems researchers can apply
an archival research design by using aggregate financial statement information
from commercial databases. The fraction of fair-value assets and liabilities
could be an indicator for the FVO. However, drawing conclusions from this
archival research design is not trivial, as accounting outcome is also aÿected by
firms’ incentives and thus does not necessarily vary with diÿerent accounting
systems (e.g. Ball, Kothari and Robin, 2000; Ball, Robin and Wu, 2003; Leuz,
Nanda and Wysocki, 2003; Bushman, Engel and Smith, 2006).
5
Since the
focus of this project is to provide de jure information about the FVO of local
GAAP systems, we think addressing this research question requires a diÿerent
approach.
5
For a discussion of the low internal validity of archival studies see Libby, Bloomfield and
Nelson (2002).
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Conceivably, there are various research methods that can be used. One
possible approach is to directly observe the FVO of local GAAP systems by
simply analyzing countries’ local standards. However, accounting standards
are complex and technical and in most cases have to be interpreted cautiously.
Classifying foreign accounting systems requires knowledge about the particu-
lar local institutional background (in addition to profound accounting skills).
Thus, we believe that self-assessment of local accounting standards leads to
translation and interpretation errors.
Another possible research method would be structured interviews of do-
mestic accounting experts. Structured interviews could be used to understand
recognition and measurement concepts of local GAAP systems. While it is
very costly in terms of eÿort, time and money to interview more than one ex-
pert per country, the reliability (internal validity) of these data is unclear. In
particular, interview statements could be biased toward personal beliefs and
preferences and thus may potentially not be fact-oriented.
Therefore, we decide to apply an online survey design to increase re-
sponses per country and thus to increase the validity of the results. Further-
more, survey responses are usually anonymous, which lowers the threat of
untruthful responses (Groves et al., 2004). The survey is pretested with ten
German accounting experts. The aim of the pretest is to increase comprehen-
sibility and to decrease potential ambiguity of the survey questions. According
to the feedback and responses, we editorially change some questions. We also
condense the survey by eliminating unnecessary questions.
The online survey is structured in three sections: Section A contains
four subsections (A1-A4) asking respondents for information about overall in-
stitutional characteristics of their home country’s local GAAP system. In
subsection A1, respondents are supposed to indicate their country of origin
(home country). Subsection A2 asks whether the home country has a local
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GAAP system diÿering from IFRS. If a respondent’s answer to A2 is negative,
they do not proceed with the survey beyond this point. All other participants
continue with the questionnaire and are asked in A3 to indicate which set of
GAAP private and public non-financial firms have to apply in their individual
and group financial statements. Subsection A4 includes four questions about
general institutional properties of local GAAP systems. Section B contains six
subsections (B1-B6) asking to characterize local GAAP properties that apply
to non-financial firms. Subsection B1 includes six questions about the lo-
cal GAAP accounting framework and subsections B2-B6 include 17 questions
about recognition and measurement principles of five diÿerent asset classes.
Section C collects personal information in order to identify the respondents’
exposure to financial accounting.
6
In subsections A4 and B1 respondents are asked to give an opinion based
on a five-point Likert scale. In subsections B2-B6 respondents are asked to
decide whether a certain recognition or measurement for a specific asset class
is prohibited, allowed or mandatory. All other subsections contain closed-ended
questions (A1-A4). All questions can be marked as ‘can’t say’. Respondents
are also given the option to leave comments in every subsection. The total
time necessary to complete the survey is on average 14 minutes. Participation
is anonymous and we do not provide incentives. The questionnaire is shown
in the appendix.
We perform the survey in three separate waves: In the first wave we col-
lect 987 e-mail addresses from participants of the 2011 American Accounting
Association (AAA) annual conference and the 2011 European Accounting As-
sociation (EAA) annual conference. We send out invitation e-mails on January
6
The survey includes seven additional questions about general institutional properties in
subsection A4 and three additional questions about recognition and initial measurement
of provisions in subsections B7 and B8. We decide to drop these questions, as for A4
we obtain low variance across countries and for B7 and B8 most respondents answer is
‘can’t say’.
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26, 2012 and a reminder on February 22. We close the first survey wave on
March 1. Since responses from the first wave predominantly stem from North
America and Europe, we collect in a second wave 777 e-mail addresses from web
pages of universities’ accounting departments located in South America, Asia
and South Africa. Invitation e-mails are sent out on March 5 and reminders
are sent on March 12. The second wave is closed on March 21. Overall, we
receive 166 responses from 46 diÿerent countries in the first two waves. This
results in a response rate of 9.41%.
7
Since we require having at least three
responses per country, we subsequently approach 1,084 researchers from coun-
tries with less than three responses in a third wave.
8
We send out invitation
e-mails on December 3 and a reminder on December 11. The third wave is
closed on December 17 and yields 51 responses from 30 countries (response
rate of 4.70%).
9
In total, we approach 1,831 researchers in all three waves and
receive 217 responses from 46 countries. The overall response rate of 11.85%
is lower than in other studies surveying accounting and finance academics.
10
Ballas and Theoharakis (2003) ask international accounting academics
to peer review international accounting journals and receive a response rate of
20.6%. Lowe and Locke (2005) investigate the same research question when
surveying UK accounting academics and obtain a response rate of 15.6%.
Brinn, Jones and Pendlebury (2001) receive a response rate of 23.6% in their
survey of UK accounting academics about the reason why UK accounting re-
searchers tend to prefer to publish in UK journals rather than top US journals.
Note that response rates depend, among other things, on the particular tar-
get population and the topic of the survey (Baruch, 1999; Sax, Gilmartin and
Bryant, 2003). Thus, surveying academics from local universities and insti-
7
If respondents answer to A2 is negative, they do not proceed with the survey beyond
this point, which probably biases the response rate upwards. Accordingly, the adjusted
response rate including these responses is 6.58%.
8
This includes 67 new e-mail addresses which we collect for the third wave.
9
The adjusted response rate for the third wave is 3.32%.
10
The adjusted overall response rate is 8.30%.
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tutes or surveying a topic which most academics are interested in should lead
to a higher response rate than in this study.
3.2 Survey Results
Our total response sample consists of 217 observations from 46 countries.
64 respondents specify in A2 that their local GAAP system does not diÿer from
IFRS and thus are excluded from the sample. We label countries in which
more than 50% of respondents indicate that their home country has a local
GAAP system ‘not diÿering from IFRS’ as IFRS countries: Australia, Brazil,
Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore and South Africa.
11
Accordingly, we limit our sample to respondents from non-IFRS countries.
This results in a local GAAP respondents’ sample with 153 observations. We
further limit the sample to respondents who fully complete sections A and B.
12
Hence, the sample contains both fully and partially (no answers in section C)
complete surveys. Additionally, we require that every country has at least three
responses, which results in a final sample of 137 responses from 28 countries.
Table 1, Panel A reports the distribution of the respondents’ academic
position, which is as follows: 52.55% are tenured professors, 31.39% are lectur-
ers or assistant professors, 10.22% are other teaching staÿ or doctoral students
and 5.84% do not provide positions. Turning to years of teaching experience,
6.57% have teaching experience under three years, 13.87% have teaching expe-
rience between three and five years, 27.01% between six and ten years, 43.80%
have teaching experience over ten years and 8.75% do not provide information
on teaching experience. The teaching experience of the respondents is on aver-
age ten years, which makes us confident that our respondents have (on average)
expertise in financial accounting. Panel B shows the number of respondents
11
We use several sources (PwC, 2013, local standard setters webpages and the Deloitte
‘IFRS Plus’ webpage) for verification.
12
However, it was possible to mark questions as ‘can’t say’. We delete respondents who
marked more than one-third of survey questions in sections A and B as ‘can’t’ say’.
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per country. Germany has the highest number with twelve responses followed
by Italy and Portugal with both eight and the US with seven responses.
[Table 1 about here]
Table 2 presents information about overall institutional characteristics
of the respective countries. In subsection A3 respondents are asked to specify
which set of GAAP (local GAAP (LGAAP), IFRS, or both (LGAAP/IFRS))
private and publicly-listed non-financial firms must apply for their individ-
ual (single legal entity) and group financial statements. Three countries (Ar-
gentina, Taiwan and the US) require an application of local GAAP for individ-
ual and group statements for private and publicly-listed firms. All other coun-
tries require local GAAP only for private firms, whereas in ten (19) countries
private firms have the option to apply IFRS for individual (group) statements.
In contrast, IFRS is mandatory for group statements of publicly-listed firms
in most countries.
13
Results for individual statements of publicly-listed firms
are mixed. Roughly, one-third mandates, one-third allows and one-third pro-
hibits the application of IFRS.
14
Based on the survey results in subsection A4,
we develop measures for the codification in governmental law (GOVLAW), the
type of standard setter (PRISETTER), the relationship of financial accounting
with tax accounting (TAXLINK) and the level of guidance oÿered by the local
GAAP system (GUIDANCE). Respondents are asked to rate the questions on
a five-point Likert scale from one (strongly disagree) to five (strongly agree).
We label countries as having a local GAAP system that is codified in govern-
13
Please note that our sample contains 17 countries from the European Economic Area
(EEA) covering the 28 EU member states plus Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway.
Publicly-listed firms located in the EEA are mandated to apply IFRS for group state-
ments.
14
EU (2010) provides an overview of the status of implementation of IFRS for countries
located in the EAA. Comparing this overview with the results in Table 2 reveals a high
degree of consistency. Solely, results of the UK diÿer in the respect that according to EU
(2010) private firms can choose between local GAAP and IFRS for their individual and
group statements and that publicly-listed non-financial firms can also choose between
local GAAP and IFRS for their individual statement.
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mental law (GOVLAW=1) if country-level median responses (strongly) agree
with the statement ‘local GAAP are codified in governmental law’. We label
countries as having a private standard setter (PRISETTER=1) if country-level
median responses (strongly) agree with the statement ‘relevant local GAAP
are developed by a private standard setter’. We label countries as having a
strong tax link (TAXLINK=1) if country-level median responses (strongly)
agree with the statement ‘local GAAP are closely related to tax regulation’.
We label countries as having a local GAAP system providing a high level of
guidance (GUIDANCE=1) if country-level responses (strongly) disagree with
the statement ‘local GAAP oÿer less explicit guidance than IFRS’. Accord-
ingly, in 21 countries local GAAP systems are codified in governmental law, in
15 countries local GAAP systems are developed by a private standard setter,
in 14 countries local GAAP systems are closely related to tax regulation and
17 countries have a local GAAP system that provides extensive guidance.
15
[Table 2 about here]
Table 3 reports the results for questions about the local GAAP account-
ing framework. Again, respondents are asked to rate questions on a five-point
Likert scale from one (strongly disagree) to five (strongly agree). Results are
presented as country-level medians with standard deviations of the responses
in brackets. In the vast majority of countries (except Argentina, Mexico and
South Korea) respondents (strongly) agree with the statement ‘historical cost
is the predominant measurement concept’. Results for the statement ‘mark-
to-market is only used whenever market prices are observable’ are mixed: Re-
spondents in Mexico strongly agree with the statement, whereas respondents in
eight countries agree, 15 countries are neutral and four disagree. The next four
statements account for the fact that market values are used for impairment
15
The ‘GAAP convergence 2002’ survey supplies an overview of accounting systems that
are tax-driven (Street, 2003). Comparing both metrics reveals a consistency rate of over
75%.
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treatments (when market values are below book values) and market values are
used for subsequent measurement purposes when market values are above book
values (revaluation model or measurement at market value). Again, in the
vast majority of countries (except Mexico and Russia) respondents (strongly)
agree with the statement that ‘mark-to-market is relevant when market values
are below book values’. This result indicates that most local GAAP systems
mandate using the ‘lower of cost or market concept’ for the subsequent mea-
surement of assets. In contrast, the vast majority of country-level opinions
disagrees or is neutral with respect to the statement ‘mark-to-market is rele-
vant when market values are above book values’. The last two statements refer
to whether ‘certain losses/gains can be reflected directly in equity without af-
fecting net income’. Respondents in four countries (strongly) disagree with
the statements, implying that losses or gains from market based measurement
are recognized in the profit or loss statement (Argentina, Austria, Germany
and Japan), whereas in twelve countries respondents (strongly) agree with
the statements, which implies that losses or gains are predominantly reflected
directly in equity.
[Table 3 about here]
Table 4, Panel A-C presents the results for recognition and measurement
principles. Respondents are asked to assess whether a certain recognition or
measurement principle is prohibited (1), allowed (2) or mandatory (3). Again,
results are presented as country-level medians with the standard deviation of
the responses in brackets.
16
Panel A provides the results for intangible assets.
In four countries, the capitalization of research and development expenditures
is prohibited (Austria, Japan, Taiwan and the US), nine allow the capital-
ization of research expenditures and only three mandate the recognition of
16
Please note that if the country-level median does not provide a clear classification (integer
number), we treat the country-level observation as if the median response would be
‘allowed’ in the following table description.
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development expenditures (Denmark, the Netherlands and Russia). The next
question asks whether intangible assets are deemed to be impaired if market
values are below book values. Impairments are mandatory in 15 countries,
allowed in eleven and prohibited in two (Greece and Poland). Revaluation of
intangible assets to market value is only allowed in four countries (Mexico,
Portugal, Russia and Slovenia). All other countries forbid the usage of the
revaluation model.
Panel B provides the results for goodwill and PPE. Mexico and Russia
allow the recognition of internally generated goodwill, whereas this accounting
treatment is prohibited in the remaining countries. The recognition of good-
will resulting from a business combination is mandatory in 19 countries and
allowed in nine. Conceptually, there exist two diÿerent subsequent measure-
ment treatments for goodwill: the amortization method and the impairment-
only method. Eleven countries mandate the use of the amortization method
and eight mandate the impairment-only method. Results for impairment of
PPE are equivalent to the results for impairment of intangibles: Impairments
are mandatory for over half of the countries, allowed for over one-third and
prohibited in two (Greece and Poland). Revaluation of PPE to market value
is allowed in ten countries and prohibited in 18.
[Table 4 about here]
Panel C shows the results for financial assets and the application of the
percentage of completion (PoC) method for long-term contracts. The mea-
surement of financial assets usually depends on diÿerent financial asset classi-
fications. We assume that financial assets can be classified into assets that are
held for trading purposes (trading securities), derivative securities and other
financial assets. 22 countries mandate an impairment of trading securities and
derivatives if market values are below book values. Impairments for other fi-
nancial assets are mandatory in 15 countries and voluntary in 13. Subsequent
23
measurement at market value is prohibited for all three financial asset classes
in Argentina, Austria, France, Germany, Italy and Turkey. However, measure-
ment at market value for trading securities (derivatives) is mandatory in ten
(13) countries and allowed in eleven (nine). Fair value measurement for other
financial assets is allowed in 18 countries and prohibited in ten. Considering
the PoC method reveals that the application of the PoC method for long-term
contracts is prohibited in Austria, the Czech Republic and Germany, allowed
in 22 countries and mandatory in Denmark, Poland and Portugal.
Altogether, our results show small accounting diÿerences across countries
with respect to the prohibition of recognizing internally generated goodwill,
the prohibition of applying the revaluation method for intangible assets, the
mandating of impairing trading securities and derivatives if market values are
below book values as well as the allowance for applying the PoC method for
long-term contracts. However, large accounting diÿerences exist for the subse-
quent measurement of goodwill (amortization method versus impairment-only
method) and for the subsequent measurement at market value of trading se-
curities and derivatives.
The survey results presented above give us the opportunity to assess the
FVO of local GAAP systems. In doing so, we rank the local GAAP systems
based on the following seven principles: (1) revaluation of intangible assets to
market value, (2) revaluation of PPE to market value, (3) subsequent mea-
surement of trading securities at market value, (4) subsequent measurement
of derivatives at market value, (5) subsequent measurement of other financial
assets at market value, (6) impairment-only method for goodwill and (7) ap-
plication of the PoC method. For every principle, we assign two points if the
principle is mandatory, one point if the principle is allowed and zero points
if the principle is prohibited. The total points across the seven principles
normalized to one compose the FVO score (FV OSCORE).
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Most accounting systems oÿer a choice between diÿerent accounting
treatments. For example, IAS 16 allows using the historical cost model or
the revaluation model for the subsequent measurement of PPE. Depending on
which accounting options are chosen, the FVO of accounting systems has an
upper and a lower bound. Therefore, we assess the maximum possible and the
minimum possible FVO of local GAAP systems. For the maximum possible
FVO (FV OMAX) two points are given if the principle is mandatory or al-
lowed and zero points are given if the principle is prohibited. For the minimum
possible FVO (FV OMIN), two points are given if the principle is mandatory
and zero points are scored if the principle is allowed or prohibited. Similar
to FV OSCORE, the summation of points is scaled to one and constitutes
FV OMAX and FV OMIN .
The values of FV OSCORE, FV OMAX and FV OMIN and the cor-
responding country rankings are illustrated in Figure 1 and Table 5. The
FV OSCORE ranges from 0.00 to 0.71 with higher values indicating more fair
value orientation (FVO). The country ranking shows that Portuguese, Slove-
nian and Russian GAAP are the top three, US GAAP are the top four and
Austrian, German and Italian GAAP are the bottom three of the worldwide
FVO. For comparison reasons, we assess the FVO of the 2012 version of IFRS
based on a separate survey with six German accounting academics and obtain
a score of 0.79. Thus, any local GAAP system (including US and UK GAAP)
is less fair value oriented than IFRS, which makes IFRS the top FVO account-
ing system worldwide. Considering the maximum possible FVO (FV OMAX)
reveals that Mexico, Russia and Slovenia have a score of 1.00. In contrast, 10
countries have a minimum possible FVO of 0.00. Again, the minimum and
maximum FVO of the 2012 version of IFRS serves as a benchmark. The re-
sults show that the maximum possible FVO of six countries is smaller than
the minimum possible FVO of IFRS.
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[Figure 1 and Table 5 about here]
3.3 Comparison with Existing Distance Measures
As mentioned above, big sample size information about the cross-country
variance of local GAAP systems already exist. Thus, a justification for provid-
ing new data is not trivial. Since distance (or diÿerence) measures that rely
on the ‘GAAP 2001’ data usually measure diÿerent constructs rather than the
FVO of local GAAP systems per se, we expect that only a weak relationship
between the FV OSCORE and the distance measures exists. In that respect,
three diÿerent distance measures proposed by Street (2002), Ding et al. (2007)
and Bae, Tan and Welker (2008) serve as comparison constructs. Given the
assumption that local GAAP systems with a high FVO do not considerably
diÿer from IFRS, the fair value orientation score (FV OSCORE) should be
negatively correlated with the distance measures.
Table 6 reports the Spearman correlation results. The correlation coe-
cients between the three measures vary between 0.58 and 0.78, which is (intu-
itively) not surprising. FV OSCORE and the Street (2002) distance measure
are correlated by -0.24. FV OSCORE and the Bae, Tan and Welker (2008)
measure are correlated by -0.30 and FV OSCORE is correlated to the Ding
et al. (2007): Divergence measure by -0.21. Altogether, FV OSCORE is only
weakly correlated with all three distance measures, which makes us confident
that the FVO of local GAAP systems cannot be approximated by the distance
scores.
[Table 6 about here]
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3.4 Fair Value Accounting Classification
Nobes and Parker (2012: 57) argue that classifications are an important
technique to “reveal underlying structures and enable prediction of the prop-
erties of an element based on its place in a classification”. Thus, classification
of local GAAP systems provides possible explanations for local GAAP simi-
larities and diÿerences worldwide and therefore, for example, for the degree of
the harmonization of local GAAP systems. Depending on the individual clas-
sification parameters, similar local GAAP systems are grouped into the same
cluster. Classification parameters could be derived from institutional charac-
teristics like cultural, economic, political and social dimensions or they directly
relate to diÿerent properties of accounting standards (Krisement, 1994: 11-12).
Early studies that distinguish local GAAP systems mainly apply deduc-
tive approaches based on institutional characteristics as classifying variables.
Thus, they do not employ statistical methods but use institutional character-
istics as an explanation for the shape of local GAAP systems. For example,
Seidler (1967) argues that based on economic, political and legal factors, local
GAAP systems could be classified into Anglo-American, British and continen-
tal European groups. With the beginning of the seventies, the audit com-
pany Price Waterhouse makes information about measurement and disclosure
treatments of local GAAP systems available. This stimulates a variety of re-
searchers to use statistical methods (e.g. factor analysis, principal component
analysis and discriminant analysis) to predict clusters. Results of this stream
of literature are heterogeneous in the number of detected clusters, which vary
from two to 12, but most studies find support for the existence of an Anglo-
American, British, continental European and Latin American cluster. Later
studies proceed to investigate whether the detected clusters can be explained
with institutional factors (for an overview of the classification literature see
d’Arcy, 2001).
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In a more recent study, d’Arcy (2001) collects data from Ordelheide and
KPMG (1995) and examines 14 developed countries plus IAS. She shows that
accounting systems are relatively similar in continental Europe, except for Swe-
den and Spain that form an own cluster. However, she is not able to identify
an Anglo-American cluster. Nobes (2011) uses archival accounting data from
large listed firms to investigate similarities in the accounting practice among
eight countries that mandate listed firms to apply IFRS. Although all firms fol-
low the same accounting rules, he provides evidence that an Anglo-American
(Australia and the UK) and a continental European cluster do exist. Thus,
diÿerences in the reporting practices are still present among these groups.
To sum up, there is a rich literature on the classification of local GAAP
systems. However, this stream of literature uses information that is now obso-
lete or outdated. Since the survey results allow us to perform a cluster analysis,
we contribute to the extant literature by using very current information about
local GAAP systems for a big sample of countries.
We follow d’Arcy (2001) and Nobes (2011) and first employ the method
of average-linkage between groups. It is a hierarchical clustering method that
presents information about similarities among observations by a tree diagram
(dendrogram). Countries are connected by vertical lines forming groups and
the height and the length determine the level of similarity between groups.
The data for the analysis consist of the results of the 17 accounting principles
presented in Table 4 (subsection B2-B6 of the survey). Since the data is
ordinal scaled, we follow d’Arcy (2001) and transfer it into a nominal scale by
splitting (dichotomizing) each accounting principle into two new variables. We
record 0,0 if the principle is prohibited, 1,0 if the principle is allowed and 1,1
points if the principle is mandatory. The dendrogram is presented in Figure 2.
Argentina, Austria, Germany and Italy form a cluster that is highly separated
from the others. Poland forms its own cluster. A further cluster is composed
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of Mexico, Portugal, Slovenia and the Russian Federation, other clusters are
very small and hard to detect.
[Figure 2 about here]
Since the average-linkage method already forces countries into clusters,
d’Arcy (2001) and Nobes (2011) propose to apply the multidimensional scaling
(MDS) method to evaluate the average-linkage (dendrogram) cluster results.
The MDS method shows the degree of similarity by geographic distance among
countries and thus displays similarities in a more comprehensive way without
forcing countries into clusters. Results are presented in Figure 3. The MDS
method supports the results of the dendrogram, but however, clusters are
easier to identify. Therefore, we group countries into six diÿerent self-defined
clusters, whereas ‘cluster 1’ is least and ‘cluster 6’ is most fair value oriented.
[Figure 3 about here]
3.5 Robustness Tests
We test the validity of the results. First, we check for aberrant responses
such as low variation in the responses or, in an extreme case, no variation
(identical responses to all questions). However, we are not able to identify
unusual response patterns. Next, we investigate whether respondents with an
extreme short or long time for completion the survey (duration) bias the re-
sults. To address this concern, we exclude all respondents with durations under
five minutes and over 40 minutes. We obtain qualitatively similar results for
all countries except for Taiwan for which the FVO strongly increases. We also
investigate whether results are related to respondents’ personal characteristics
(academic position and teaching experience), but do not find evidence for this
phenomenon. Furthermore, there is the concern that sampling error and/or
non-response bias aÿect the results, which questions validity (Groves et al.,
2004). Sampling error is the possibility that our results are not represen-
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tative for the entire population (Sills and Song, 2002). For every country,
all accounting academics represent the entire country-level population. Non-
response bias refers to the possibility that the answers from respondents diÿer
from those of non-respondents (Sax, Gilmartin and Bryant, 2003). Armstrong
and Overton (1977) claim that late respondents are to some extent compa-
rable to non-respondents. Accordingly, they propose to compare early with
late respondents entries. We follow this proposition in several ways. First,
we investigate whether the responses diÿer across the three separate survey
waves. Second, we examine early and late responses within the individual sur-
vey waves. However, there is no indication that non-response bias is a problem
in this survey.
4 Conclusion
Despite the current process of international accounting harmonization,
local GAAP systems continue to play an important role for a huge number
of firms worldwide as they are used in diÿerent contractual settings and for
valuation purposes. However, there is surprisingly little descriptive evidence
on the international heterogeneity of local GAAP systems. Therefore, the aim
of this study is to provide descriptive evidence about the fair value orientation
(FVO) of local GAAP systems.
This survey collects the views about general characteristics as well as
main recognition and measurement principles of 137 financial accounting aca-
demics from 28 countries. Results show that local GAAP systems are harmo-
nized for most accounting principles. However, diÿerences in the cross-country
FVO basically arise from diÿerent subsequent measurement concepts for finan-
cial assets and goodwill. The survey results enable us to rank countries’ local
GAAP systems across their FVO. Therefore, we construct a country-level FVO
score (FV OSCORE) based on seven accounting principles. The score ranking
shows that fair value accounting is most incorporated into Portuguese, Slove-
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nian and Russian GAAP, whereas fair value accounting is least incorporated
into Austrian, German and Italian GAAP. Furthermore, we are able to show
that the FVO of the 2012 version of IFRS is higher than any of the 28 local
GAAP systems.
There are several limitations to our study. First, our country-level re-
sponse rate is low and ranges from three to 12 responses, which raises internal
validity concerns. We cannot rule out that respondents misinterpret some
questions, simply guess or that answers are biased towards personal beliefs
and preferences. Nonetheless, we try to address this concern by pretesting the
survey in order to obtain a consistent understanding of the survey questions.
However, survey studies with a small sample size are always limited in terms
of internal validity. Second, we investigate the FVO of local GAAP systems
from a de jure standpoint. De jure accounting principles may diÿer from the
de facto accounting practice (Tay and Parker, 1990; Nobes, 1998). One reason
could be that most accounting systems require meeting specific criteria for an
accounting treatment and it often depends on management judgment whether
or not specific criteria are met (the so-called implicit accounting option). An-
other explanation could be that an accounting issue is not regulated in local
GAAP and thus every accounting practice is (de jure) possible. In addition,
de jure accounting principles could diÿer from the accounting practice because
of a weak accounting enforcement environment. Thus, researchers should be
cautious when interpreting our results. Third, we only consider a small subset
of accounting system principles. For example, we do not consider disclosure
requirements. Fair value disclosures are a subset of an accounting systems’ fair
value orientation. Therefore, it is left to future research to improve the quality
and extent of information about recognition, measurement and disclosure of
accounting principles.
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Appendix: LGAAP Survey
Subsections A1-A3
International Local GAAP Survey (LGAAP Survey)
You were selected to participate in this study because of your regional origin and your scholarly background in the
area of financial accounting. We kindly ask you for your support. Since the quality of our response data is crucial for
the success of our project, we will ask for some demographic information in order to identify your exposure to finan-
cial accounting issues. All personal data will be kept strictly confidential.
We know that time is a scarce resource. We worked hard to keep the survey as short and self-explanatory as possi-
ble. It should take no longer than 20 minutes to complete. We kindly ask you for your assessments about your home
country’s local GAAP. In case of doubt, your home country should be the country for which you possess the highest
level of institutional financial accounting knowledge.
If you are not able to answer a question or if you think that a question is not applicable, then please indicate by mark-
ing “Can’t say” in the following questions.
A: General Characteristics of Your Home Country’s Locally-Developed Generally Accepted Accounting
Principles (local GAAP)
A1: Please identify the country for which you will be answering this survey (your home country):
_______________________________________
Yes No
A2: Does your home country have local GAAP which differ from International
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS)?
܆ ܆
You only have to answer the following questions if your answer to question A2 is “Yes”. If your answer to A2
is “No” you have completed the survey at this point.
A3: Please specify which set of GAAP (local GAAP (LGAAP) or IFRS) publicly listed and private non-financial firms
have to apply preparing their individual (single legal entity) and group financial statements by putting the re-
spective abbreviation in the respective cell of the table below. If a non-financial firm can apply both account-
ing regimes, please indicate this by putting “LGAAP/IFRS” in the respective cell.
Individual statement Group statement
Publicly listed non-financial firms
Private non-financial firms
If applicable: Usage of IFRS by publicly listed non-financial firms is required/possible since _____________ .
If applicable: Usage of IFRS by private non-financial firms is required/possible since _____________ .
The reminder of the survey focuses on the local GAAP of your home country. If in doubt, please base your an-
swers on the version of the local GAAP which applies to publicly listed non-financial firms (or has applied to
them prior to mandatory IFRS adoption).
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Subsections C1-C5
C: General Information
Please tell us something about yourself. This information will help us to compare response behavior across
survey participants.
C1: What characterizes best your current academic position?
Select one
Professor (tenured)
܆
Assistant professor/lecturer (untenured)
܆
Other teaching staff
܆
Doctoral student
܆
Other, please specify: ___________________________
C2: How many years of teaching experience in the area of financial accounting do you have? ____________
C3: In the past five years: Which of the following financial accounting courses did you teach?
Introduction to financial accounting
܆
Intermediate financial accounting
܆
Advanced financial accounting
܆
Financial statement analysis
܆
Auditing
܆
International accounting
܆
Other, please specify: ___________________________
Yes No
C4: Have you collected financial accounting experience outside academia? ܆ ܆
If yes, how many years of work experience do you have in the area of financial accounting
outside academia? ______________
C5: We might want to come back to you with questions about your questionnaire. Providing us with your email
address would help us to significantly improve the data quality of this survey.
Your email address will be treated strictly confidential. Feel free not to give your contact information.
My email address is ____________________________________
Thank you very much for taking the time to participate in our survey. We greatly ap-
preciate your effort. For questions or comments about this survey do not hesitate to
contact us at: lgaap@wiwi.hu-berlin.de.
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Figure 1: Fair Value Orientation by Country
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Notes: FV OSCORE is a based on the following seven principles: (1) revaluation of intangible
assets to market value, (2) revaluation of PPE to market value, (3) subsequent measurement of
trading securities at market value, (4) subsequent measurement of derivatives at market value,
(5) subsequent measurement of other financial assets at market value, (6) impairment-only
method for goodwill and (7) application of the PoC method. For every principle, we assign
two points if the principle is mandatory and one point if the principle is allowed. The total of
points across the seven principles normalized to one composes the FVO score (FV OSCORE).
FV OMAX is the maximum possible FVO and is calculated as follows: two points are scored
if the principle is mandatory or allowed and zero points are scored if the principle is prohibited.
FV OMIN is the minimum possible FVO and is calculated as follows: two points are scored if
the principle is mandatory and zero points are scored if the principle is allowed or prohibited.
Similar to FV OSCORE, the summation of points is scaled to one and constitutes FV OMAX
and FV OMIN . Note that the exact score values are shown in Table 5.
42
Figure 2: Dendrogram of Average-Linkage
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
L
2
d
i
s
s
i
m
i
l
a
r
i
t
y
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
A
r
g
e
n
t
i
n
a
A
u
s
t
r
i
a
G
e
r
m
a
n
y
I
t
a
l
y
T
u
r
k
e
y
B
e
l
g
i
u
m
F
i
n
l
a
n
d
S
w
e
d
e
n
U
n
i
t
e
d
K
i
n
g
d
o
m
D
e
n
m
a
r
k
N
e
t
h
e
r
l
a
n
d
s
G
r
e
e
c
e
N
o
r
w
a
y
C
z
e
c
h
R
e
p
u
b
l
i
c
J
a
p
a
n
S
o
u
t
h
K
o
r
e
a
C
h
i
n
a
S
w
i
t
z
e
r
l
a
n
d
C
a
n
a
d
a
U
n
i
t
e
d
S
t
a
t
e
s
S
p
a
i
n
T
a
i
w
a
n
F
r
a
n
c
e
M
e
x
i
c
o
P
o
r
t
u
g
a
l
S
l
o
v
e
n
i
a
R
u
s
s
i
a
n
F
e
d
e
r
a
t
i
o
n
P
o
l
a
n
d
Figure 3: Multidimensional Scaling
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of the Response
Sample
Panel A: Respondents’ Personal Information
Academic Position N Perc
Professor (tenured) 72 52.55%
Lecturer/Assistant Professor 43 31.39%
Other Teaching Staÿ 7 5.11%
Doctoral student 7 5.11%
No Information 8 5.84%
Total 137 100.00%
Years of Teaching Experience N Perc
1-2 9 6.57%
3-5 19 13.87%
6-10 37 27.01%
> 10 60 43.80%
No Information 12 8.75%
Total 137 100.00%
Panel B: Respondents per Country
Country N Country N
Argentina 3 Netherlands 4
Austria 6 Norway 5
Belgium 5 Poland 4
Canada 5 Portugal 8
China 5 Russia 5
Czech Republic 4 Slovenia 5
Denmark 3 South Korea 3
Finland 5 Spain 4
France 3 Sweden 5
Germany 12 Switzerland 4
Greece 5 Taiwan 3
Italy 8 Turkey 4
Japan 4 UK 5
Mexico 3 US 7
Notes: The response sample contains both fully
and partially complete surveys. We also require
the response sample to include countries with at
least three responses. This yields a sample size of
137 responses from 28 countries. N is the number
of responses.
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Table 4: Recognition and Measurement
Panel A: Intangibles
Intangible Assets
(1=prohibited 2=allowed 3=mandatory)
Recognition Measurement
Research Development Impairment if Revaluation if
Country
Expenditures Expenditures BV > MV BV < MV
Argentina 2 (0.58) 2 (0.00) 3 (0.58) 1 (0.58)
Austria 1 (0.00) 1 (0.00) 3 (0.41) 1 (0.00)
Belgium 2 (0.71) 2 (0.00) 3 (0.55) 1 (0.00)
Canada 1 (0.00) 2 (0.45) 3 (1.10) 1 (0.00)
China 1 (0.45) 2 (0.45) 2 (1.00) 1 (0.50)
Czech Republic 1.5 (0.58) 2 (0.82) 2.5 (0.58) 1 (0.00)
Denmark 1 (0.00) 3 (0.58) 3 (0.00) 1 (0.00)
Finland 1 (0.00) 2 (0.45) 3 (0.58) 1 (0.00)
France 1 (0.00) 2 (0.58) 3 (0.00) 1 (0.58)
Germany 1 (0.29) 2 (0.00) 3 (0.29) 1 (0.00)
Greece 2 (0.58) 2 (0.00) 1 (1.15) 1 (0.00)
Italy 2 (0.71) 2 (0.53) 2 (0.89) 1 (0.00)
Japan 1 (0.50) 1 (0.58) 2.5 (0.71) 1 (0.00)
Mexico 1 (0.00) 2 (1.00) 3 (1.15) 2 (0.58)
Netherlands 1 (0.00) 3 (0.50) 3 (0.58) 1 (0.50)
Norway 2 (0.00) 2 (0.50) 3 (1.00) 1 (0.50)
Poland 1 (0.50) 1.5 (0.96) 1 (0.58) 1 (0.00)
Portugal 1 (0.00) 2 (0.53) 2 (0.49) 2 (0.38)
Russia 2 (0.55) 3 (0.55) 2 (0.50) 2 (0.55)
Slovenia 1 (0.45) 2 (0.45) 2 (0.58) 2 (0.84)
South Korea 1 (0.00) 2 (0.00) 2 (0.00) 1 (0.00)
Spain 2 (0.00) 2.5 (0.58) 3 (0.00) 1 (0.00)
Sweden 1 (0.45) 2 (0.55) 3 (0.89) 1 (0.55)
Switzerland 1 (0.00) 2 (0.00) 2.5 (0.58) 1 (0.00)
Taiwan 1 (0.00) 1 (0.00) 2 (0.58) 1 (0.58)
Turkey 2 (0.50) 1.5 (0.58) 2 (0.50) 1 (0.00)
UK 1 (0.45) 2 (0.00) 3 (0.00) 1 (0.58)
US 1 (0.00) 1 (0.38) 3 (0.76) 1 (0.00)
Median 1.30 1.95 2.52 1.14
Variance 0.21 0.28 0.38 0.13
Notes: This table presents results from responses to subsection B2 of the survey, which is
presented in the appendix. The sample size is 137 responses from 28 countries. Based on
the country-level responses, we record one point if the principle is prohibited, two points if
the principle is allowed and three points if the principle is mandatory. Values in brackets are
standard deviations of the country-level responses. ‘BV’ denotes book value and ‘MV’ denotes
market value.
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Table 5: Fair Value Orientation of Local GAAP
Country FV OSCORE FV OMAX FV OMIN
Portugal 0.71 (1) 0.86 (4) 0.57 (1)
Slovenia 0.71 (1) 1.00 (1) 0.43 (2)
Russia 0.64 (3) 1.00 (1) 0.29 (6)
US 0.61 (4) 0.71 (6) 0.43 (2)
Mexico 0.57 (5) 1.00 (1) 0.14 (12)
Spain 0.57 (5) 0.71 (6) 0.43 (2)
UK 0.57 (5) 0.86 (4) 0.14 (12)
Canada 0.50 (8) 0.71 (6) 0.29 (6)
Denmark 0.50 (8) 0.57 (13) 0.43 (2)
Netherlands 0.46 (10) 0.71 (6) 0.14 (12)
South Korea 0.43 (11) 0.57 (13) 0.29 (6)
Taiwan 0.43 (11) 0.57 (13) 0.29 (6)
Japan 0.39 (13) 0.57 (13) 0.29 (6)
China 0.36 (14) 0.71 (6) 0.00 (19)
Czech Republic 0.36 (14) 0.43 (21) 0.29 (6)
Poland 0.36 (14) 0.57 (13) 0.14 (12)
Greece 0.32 (17) 0.57 (13) 0.14 (12)
Norway 0.32 (17) 0.43 (21) 0.14 (12)
Switzerland 0.32 (17) 0.71 (6) 0.00 (19)
Belgium 0.29 (20) 0.71 (6) 0.00 (19)
Finland 0.29 (20) 0.57 (13) 0.00 (19)
Sweden 0.29 (20) 0.57 (13) 0.00 (19)
France 0.21 (23) 0.29 (23) 0.14 (12)
Turkey 0.11 (24) 0.29 (23) 0.00 (19)
Argentina 0.08 (25) 0.17 (25) 0.00 (19)
Italy 0.07 (26) 0.14 (26) 0.00 (19)
Austria 0.00 (27) 0.00 (27) 0.00 (19)
Germany 0.00 (27) 0.00 (27) 0.00 (19)
IFRS 0.79 1.00 0.43
Notes: FV OSCORE is a based on the following seven principles: (1)
revaluation of intangible assets to market value, (2) revaluation of PPE to
market value, (3) subsequent measurement of trading securities at mar-
ket value, (4) subsequent measurement of derivatives at market value,
(5) subsequent measurement of other financial assets at market value,
(6) impairment-only method for goodwill and (7) application of the PoC
method. For every principle, we assign two points if the principle is
mandatory and one point if the principle is allowed. The total of points
across the seven principles normalized to one composes the FVO score
(FV OSCORE). FV OMAX is the maximum possible FVO and is calcu-
lated as follows: two points are scored if the principle is mandatory or al-
lowed and zero points are scored if the principle is prohibited. FV OMIN
is the minimum possible FVO and is calculated as follows: two points are
scored if the principle is mandatory and zero points are scored if the prin-
ciple is allowed or prohibited. Similar to FV OSCORE, the summation
of points is scaled to one and constitutes FV OMAX and FV OMIN .
The results of this table are also shown in Figure 1.
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Table 6: Spearman Correlation with GAAP Diÿerence Measures
FV OSCORE Street Bae et al. Ding et al.
(2002) (2008) (2007):
Divergence
FV OSCORE 1
-0.24
(0.22)Street (2002)
N=28
1
-0.30 0.78
(0.12) (0.00)Bae et al. (2008)
N=28 N=28
1
Ding et al. (2007): -0.21 0.65 0.58
Divergence (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
N=18 N=24 N=24
1
Notes: Street (2002) summarizes the ‘GAAP 2001’ survey and ranks countries based
on the number of total diÿerences. Bae et al. (2008) assesses how local GAAP
systems diÿer to IAS on 21 key accounting items. Ding et al. (2007): Divergence
covers whether a transaction is treated diÿerently in IAS and local GAAP. All three
measures are based on the ‘GAAP 2001’ survey results.
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Financial Accounting Regime Choice when Objectives Compete
Joachim Gassen and Timo Eisenschink
Abstract: This paper investigates the determinants of financial accounting
regime choice in a setting with competing financial accounting objectives. We
model the regime choice of a risk-neutral entrepreneur who needs financial
accounting information for contracting with a managerial agent and for com-
municating the firm value to a risk-averse secondary capital market. Our
comparative static results indicate that the preference of the entrepreneur for
a fair value accounting regime increases with the relative importance of the sec-
ondary capital market and the outside options of the managerial agent, while
it decreases with the overall quality of the accounting signal, the eÿectiveness
of the enforcement process and managerial productivity. Our empirical evi-
dence, which is based on country-year level, country-level and US time series
analysis, provides support for most of the theoretical predictions.
Keywords: Financial Accounting, Contracting, Valuation, Fair Value, His-
torical Cost
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1 Introduction
Financial reporting requires a financial accounting regime. The develop-
ment of such a regime is the main purpose of financial accounting standard
setters around the globe. As one of the consequences of the 2007/2008 financial
crisis, financial accounting regime choice attracted wide-spread attention since
several discussants suspected the fair value financial accounting regime to be
one of the building blocks of the crisis (Ryan, 2008; Laux and Leuz, 2009).
Selecting a financial accounting regime requires balancing the advantages
and disadvantages of competing alternatives. These pros and cons vary with
the usage of financial accounting information in diÿerent contractual settings.
Thus, financial accounting regimes are typically designed and evaluated with
a certain financial accounting objective in mind. Such an objective could
be to provide capital market participants with information for valuing their
stakes. An alternative objective could be to provide owners of a company
with information that they can use as a contractual component in typical firm
contracts like, for example, debt and managerial compensation contracts. In
theory, these alternative objectives cause diÿerent accounting regimes to be
ecient (Gjesdal, 1981; Paul, 1992). In addition, financial accounting regime
choice is an evolutionary process. Also, since financial accounting regimes are
regulated, diÿerent financial accounting objectives aÿect the regulation at the
jurisdictional-level. Thus, financial accounting regime choice can be expected
to be simultaneously determined by competing objectives in reality.
This is why in this paper we investigate determinants of financial ac-
counting regime choice in a setting where financial accounting objectives com-
pete. Doing so, we strive to understand the observable cross-country variance
of financial accounting regimes. A substantial body of the comparative in-
ternational accounting literature is based on the (mostly implicit) assumption
that a financial accounting regime exists which, if followed by firms and au-
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ditors, provides market participants with ‘high quality’ financial accounting
information. Firms and countries whose financial accounting information (and
regimes) diÿer from that ‘high quality prototype’ are assumed to be providing
an inecient ‘low quality’ information environment (Francis et al., 2004; De-
chow, Ge and Schrand, 2010). We question this view by investigating whether
the observed variance in financial accounting regimes and financial account-
ing outcomes worldwide could instead be an ecient response to the relative
and varying importance of competing financial accounting objectives across
countries.
To achieve this objective, we develop a simple three-period model that
can be seen as an extension to the model of Goldman and Slezak (2006). It in-
vestigates the usage of accounting information in a share-based compensation
setting where a manager has the possibility to manipulate a financial report.
While Goldman and Slezak (2006) focus on this management compensation
problem, we extend their setting by introducing a competing valuation objec-
tive. Like Goldman and Slezak (2006), we model capital-market participants
as being risk-averse. The entrepreneur, who is risk-neutral, has a consumption-
driven incentive to sell a part of his investment to the capital market in the
interim period. Thus, he benefits from better-informed market participants
because they will on average be oÿering a higher price for the share.
In the first period, the entrepreneur has the option to choose between two
accounting regimes. The first accounting regime, which we label as historical
cost (HC), reports only internally-generated eÿects on firm value while the sec-
ond (fair value, FV) reports in addition exogenous eÿects on firm value, such
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as, for example, market price changes.
1
Both reports are noisy and by defini-
tion, managerial productivity aÿects the internal components of firm value but
not the exogenous components. The entrepreneur also designs a linear stock-
based compensation contract. The manager then decides upon the oÿered
contract (consisting of the compensation contract and the chosen accounting
regime), determines her eÿort level and exerts eÿort and decides on a costly
manipulation (which aÿects her own utility but not the value of the firm).
At the beginning of the second period, the manager learns the noisy
information from the accounting system and issues a financial report to the
public. Capital market participants are modeled to be rational but risk-averse.
So, they are able to predict the equilibrium amount of manipulation and their
willingness to pay is negatively-related to the expected variance of the terminal
firm value conditional on their information. As the fair value accounting regime
provides them with more detailed information about the terminal value of the
firm, the stock price of period two, as expected in period one, is on average
higher when the fair value accounting regime is being used. This generates an
incentive in period one for the entrepreneur to choose the fair value accounting
regime, while in general, the historical accounting regime allows more ecient
risk sharing between the risk-neutral entrepreneur and the risk-averse manager.
The manager is compensated based on the observed stock price in period two
and the entrepreneur sells a fraction of his firm to smooth consumption. In
the final period, which is too far in the future to allow contracting upon its
outcomes, the terminal firm value of the firm is realized and the entrepreneur
liquidates his remaining shares of the firm.
1
It seems important to note that these two accounting regimes are highly stylized versions
of the multi-faceted designs of real-life financial accounting regimes. For example, a
very common accounting approach is the so-called ‘lower of cost or market principle’.
These asymmetric regimes generally cause kinky (and thus non-fully diÿerentiable) utility
functions conditional on ex post information arrival. We decide to use highly stylized
accounting regimes for the analysis as this allows us to keep the model and the succeeding
empirical analysis traceable.
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Based on this set-up the results show that, in equilibrium, the entrepreneur
is more likely to choose the fair value accounting regime when his preference
for consumption smoothing or the risk-averseness of capital market partici-
pants increases. Also, he is more inclined to choose the fair value regime when
the potential productivity of the manager decreases or the disutility of the
manager increases. In the latter two cases, incentivizing the manager becomes
relatively more costly (disutility argument) or less relevant (productivity ar-
gument) and this is why the relative benefit of informing market participants
about firm value becomes more important. Finally, we find that as account-
ing becomes noisier and easier to manipulate, the fair value regime becomes
more attractive for the entrepreneur. The intuition for this finding is a little
bit less obvious. First, accounting noise makes stock prices more volatile and
this worsens the risk sharing between manager and entrepreneur based on the
stock-based compensation contract, making the valuation objective relatively
more attractive. Second, if accounting becomes easier to manipulate, the man-
ager will manipulate more in equilibrium. Ultimately, the entrepreneur has to
compensate her for this utility loss. In order to reduce this deadweight loss, it
is rational for the entrepreneur to put less weight on the compensation contract
and more weight on the capital market information role of accounting.
We continue by testing these theoretical predictions empirically. As fi-
nancial accounting regime decisions are done at the regulatory level over time,
we need to develop a country-level measure of the chosen financial account-
ing regime and then study its determinants. Since no undisputed measure of
financial accounting regime choice exists in the literature, we develop a re-
search design which uses four diÿerent measures of fair value orientation to
triangulate the robustness of the findings.
The first measure of fair value orientation is based on firm-year level ac-
counting choices and thus can be characterized as an output-oriented measure.
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It is the first principle component of the following constructs: (a) the abso-
lute residual of country-year level value relevance regressions, (b) the absolute
residual of country-year level regressions of positive returns on earnings, (c)
the absolute residual of country-year level regressions measuring the relation
between market and book values, (d) the number of analysts following a firm
and (e) the delay between fiscal year end and the annual financial statement
disclosure date. We are able to estimate our constructs for a broad sample of
40,460 firm-year observations covering 40 countries, generating a total of 495
country-year observations.
Our second and third measures are input-oriented and assess the financial
accounting regulation at the jurisdictional (country-) level. For the second
measure we use practitioner publications and additional accounting literature
to rank financial accounting regimes by their fair value orientation. Because
of limited data availability, we are able to calculate this measure only for 18
out of our 40 countries. This is why we rely on a survey conducted with
accounting academics around the globe to assess the fair value orientation of
financial accounting regimes for a broader sample of 25 out of our 40 countries
(Eisenschink, 2013).
While our output-oriented first measure is calculated at the country-
year level, the input-oriented second and third measures are constructed at
the country-level and thus exhibit no variance over time. To address this
limitation of our input-oriented measures, we use standards published by the
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) over the time period 1979 to
2009 and a linguistic approach to generate a time series measure of the fair
value orientation of US Generally Accepted Accounting Principals (GAAP).
The resulting fourth measure documents an increasing fair value orientation
of US GAAP over time.
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We acknowledge that each single fair value orientation measure likely
exhibits significant measurement error. However, all of our constructs are sig-
nificantly positively correlated. We posit that, while they are likely to capture
diÿerent aspects of fair value orientation, our combined constructs provide
comprehensive and robust measures which can be used to test the predictions
of our theoretical model.
We conceptualize our theoretical predictions by investigating the impacts
of four distinct determinants on fair value orientation: (a) the relative impor-
tance of capital markets, (b) the cost of top-level management incentivization,
(c) the potential productivity of management and (d) the eÿectiveness of the
enforcement infrastructure. In line with our theoretical findings, we expect
(a), (b) and (d) to be positively related with the fair value orientation of the
respective financial accounting regime, while we assume (c) to be negatively
related.
Our findings indicate a robust positive relation between the relative im-
portance of equity markets and the fair value orientation of the financial ac-
counting regimes and a robust negative relation between the potential man-
agement productivity and fair value orientation. We find weaker support for
the positive relation of opportunity cost of top-level management with the
fair value orientation. We find no unambiguous support for the eÿect of the
enforcement infrastructure on fair value orientation.
Our study makes four distinct contributes to the literature. First, our
paper adds to the theoretical literature that investigates the interplay be-
tween accounting objectives and financial accounting regimes (e.g. Beaver and
Demski, 1979; Gjesdal, 1981; Liang, 2000; Lambert, 2001; Liang, 2001; Chris-
tensen and Demski, 2003; Arya et al., 2004; Christensen, Feltham and Sabac,
2005; Drymiotes and Hemmer, 2013). We extend this literature by explic-
itly modeling a financial accounting regime choice in a setting with competing
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objectives. Second, we contribute to studies analyzing incentives for eÿects of
earnings management in mandatory reporting settings with partially verifiable
information and rational expectations (Fischer and Verrecchia, 2000; Gold-
man and Slezak, 2006; Guttman, Kadan and Kandel, 2006; Laux and Laux,
2009; Beyer et al., 2010 for a general overview) by investigating the eÿects
of competing objectives and the strategic interaction of accounting standard
setting, managerial behavior and rational capital market participants.
Third, we extend the empirical accounting literature which studies the
determinants of accounting regime choice both within and across countries
(Ball, Kothari and Robin, 2000; Ball, Robin and Wu, 2003; Leuz, Nanda and
Wysocki, 2003; Ding et al., 2007; Muller, Riedl and Sellhorn, 2011; Christensen
and Nikolaev, 2013). While this literature tends to focus on country-level and
firm-level determinants of firm-level accounting choices within existing finan-
cial accounting regimes our focus is on the determinants of the financial ac-
counting regime choice itself. In that respect, our study complements recent
research that uses political economy arguments to explain financial account-
ing regime choices (Allen and Ramanna, 2013; Bertomeu and Cheynel, 2013)
by proposing an ecient contracting explanation for the cross-jurisdictional
variance in financial accounting regimes. Fourth, we develop an innovative
output-oriented measure of fair value orientation at the firm-level and two
input-oriented measures of the fair value orientation and a time series measure
of the fair value orientation of US GAAP.
This paper continues as follows: The second section provides the theo-
retical model. The third section presents the empirical test design, the data
and the results. The fourth section concludes.
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2 Model
2.1 Basic Set-up
Our principal agent model is based on Goldman and Slezak (2006) and
encompasses three periods in a zero interest world. In the first period t
0
a
risk-neutral entrepreneur owns an asset (for example a patent to produce an
innovate product) and sets up a single asset firm. Since the entrepreneur is
unable to run the firm he has to hire a risk-averse manager. Before he hires
the manager the entrepreneur selects a financial accounting regime AR and
then oÿers a linear stock price based compensation contract (ω
0
, ω
1
) to the
manager. While the manager does not know the terminal asset value (hence-
forth terminal firm value), she decides upon acceptance of the contract, her
unobservable eÿort level, which is denoted by e and the level of manipulation
she will exert over the accounting report, which is denoted by α. The ter-
minal firm value materializes in the third period and is based on cash flows
from operating the asset. The cash flows depend on managerial eÿort, an ex-
ogenous productivity factor, production noise and the market success of the
asset (henceforth market risk). The production noise and the market risk are
additive and exogenous to the actions of the manager:
V = βe+ µ+ η, (1)
where V is terminal firm value, β > 0 is the productivity factor, µ ∼ N(0, σ
2
µ
)
is production noise and η ∼ N(0, σ
2
η
) is the market risk of the asset. The
parameter β and the distribution of µ and η are public information.
In the second period t
1
the manager privately receives the noisy account-
ing report θ
T
AR
and publicly releases the manipulated accounting report θ
AR
that is used by risk-averse investors (capital market participants) to determine
the stock price, labeled as S. The entrepreneur trades a part c of his wealth to
smooth consumption and additionally the manager is compensated based on
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the contract that is linked to the stock price: W = ω
0
+ω
1
S. In the last period
t
2
, which is too far to be useful for contracting, the firm is terminated and the
entrepreneur receives (1− c) of the terminal firm value.
The entrepreneur is risk-neutral but has a preference for consumption
smoothing, which is denoted by c. This assumption is useful in order to gen-
erate a demand for informative stock prices, as the entrepreneur benefits from
ecient stock prices for consumption smoothing purposes. Otherwise if we
relax the consumption smoothing assumption, the entrepreneur will only care
about ecient contracting with the manager and would choose the accounting
regime which is optimal to induce high managerial eÿort. The entrepreneurs’
utility function is:
U
E
(V, S θ
AR
) = (1− c)(V −W ) + c S (2)
where V − W is the net pay-oÿ in t
2
, c is the entrepreneurs’ preference for
consumption smoothing and S is the stock price in t
1
.
In our model the accounting regime AR is used to solve moral hazard
problems with the risk-averse manager who has to run the firm (to provide ef-
ficient contracting) and to reduce information asymmetries between the man-
ager and an exogenous risk-averse capital market (to provide ecient stock
pricing). We assume that the entrepreneur can choose in t
0
between two al-
ternative accounting regimes, both oÿering a noisy accounting signal:
HC : θ
T
HC
= βe+ µ+ λ (historical cost) (3)
FV : θ
T
FV
= βe+ µ+ η + λ (fair value) (4)
We model θ
T
HC
by a noisy signal of the productivity adjusted eÿort (labour
input) and production noise, where λ is accounting noise that is N(0, σ
2
λ
)
distributed. θ
T
FV
also incorporates the market sucess of the asset. Hence, the
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two accounting regimes diÿer in the way they recognize market risk. The
manager has discretion over the accounting report and releases the noisy and
manipulated accounting report θ
AR
= θ
T
AR
+ α.
The manager has a LEN-utility function U
M
(W, e, α) = −exp [−γ (W −
K(e)−M(α))], where γ represents the risk aversion coecient and K(e) =
δ
2
e
2
represents the disutility of eÿort and M(α) =
ξ
2
represents the cost of manip-
ulating the accounting report (Fischer and Verrecchia, 2000).
2
The managers’
reservation level of utility is zero and thus the managers’ t
0
objective function
has the following form:
E
0

U
M
(W, e, α) AR

= E
0
[W AR]−
γ
2
V ar [W AR]−
δ
2
e
2
−
ξ
2
α
2
(5)
2.2 Stock Price, Optimal Eÿort and Manipulation
In our model managerial compensation is based on the second period
stock price. To solve for the optimal amount of eÿort and manipulation, we first
have to determine the stock price. Doing so, we use a (simple) capital market
where shares are traded. We assume that each investor in the capital market
forms rational expectations in t
1
about the terminal firm value conditional on
the accounting report:
E
I
1
[V θ
AR
] = θ
AR
− α
e
− E
I
1
[λ]
= βeˆ+ E
I
1
[µ+ η + λ θ
AR
] + (αˆ− α
e
)− E
I
1
[λ] (6)
2
The LEN assumptions are very restrictive about linear compensation contracts and nor-
mally distributed performance measures (Hemmer, 2004, Armstrong, Guay and Weber,
2010). Relaxing the LEN framework and, for example, using a general (nonlinear) com-
pensation contract would lead to a cumbersome analysis that would likely not yield any
testable hypotheses.
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Because investors are rational and know all public information they can per-
fectly predict the equilibrium amount of eÿort and manipulation. Thus, in
equilibrium, manipulation does not have an impact on the stock price (αˆ−α
e
=
0). However, because the investors cannot directly infer the amount of pro-
duction noise, market risk and accounting noise, they have to form rational
expectations:
E
I
1
[µ+ η + λ θ
HC
] = µ+ λ (7)
E
I
1
[µ+ η + λ θ
FV
] = µ+ η + λ (8)
Since accounting noise distorts the signal of the terminal firm value, investors
correct the signal with E
I
1
[λ]. We assume that each investor has a negative ex-
ponential utility function. According to Verrecchia (2001) in a perfect compe-
tition setting when each investor maximizes her expected wealth, the demand
of a risk-averse investor i for a risky asset is a function of the risk-adjusted
(r is the risk aversion of the investors) expectation of the residual firm value
minus the stock price:
D
i
=
E
I
1
[V −W θ
AR
]− S
r V ar [V θ
AR
]
(9)
In equilibrium, the supply equals the demand and thus the market clearing
condition
P
N
i=1
D
i
= N
¯
D holds. Now we can endogenize the stock price S,
which can be written in the form:
S =
1
1 + ω
1

βeˆ+ E
I
1
[µ+ η + λ θ
AR

+ (αˆ− α
e
)− ω
0
− r
¯
DV ar [V θ
AR
]) (10)
In line with market participants being risk-averse, higher risk lowers the stock
price. In the model, we capture risk by the conditional variance of the ter-
minal firm value. Because the historical cost accounting regime reveals less
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information about the terminal firm value than the fair value accounting
regime, the risk premium is higher. This can be illustrated be the inequality:
V ar [V θ
HC
] = σ
2
η
+σ
2
λ
> V ar [V θ
FV
] = σ
2
λ
. Note that because of accounting
noise, the investors cannot perfectly predict the terminal firm value even under
the fair value accounting regime.
After determining the stock price, we can solve the optimal amount of
eÿort and manipulation maximizing managers’ utility function. We obtain the
equilibrium amount of eÿort and manipulation after substituting the expected
stock price and the variance of the stock price in (5) and taking the first order
condition with respect to e and α.
Lemma 1 The equilibrium amount of eÿort and manipulation are character-
ized as follows:
eˆ =
ωˆ
δ
β (11)
αˆ =
ωˆ
ξ
(12)
where ωˆ ≡
ωˆ
1
1 + ωˆ
1
(13)
Proof. See appendix.
For eˆ we obtain the same result as Goldman and Slezak (2006). The
optimal amount of eÿort will increase if the productivity and the pay-for-
performance sensitivity increases and will decrease if inducing high eÿort be-
comes more costly. On the other hand, the linear compensation contract in-
centivizes the manager to manipulate the accounting report. However, in-
creasing the disutility of manipulation ξ will lower the equilibrium amount of
manipulation. Please note that risk and the accounting regime have no direct
impact on the equilibrium amount of eÿort and manipulation. However, they
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are involved in the compensation contract optimization problem and thus will
indirectly influence eˆ and αˆ.
2.3 Optimal Compensation Contract and Accounting Regime Choice
Since the model is solved by backward induction, we first have to deter-
mine the optimal compensation contract for each financial accounting regime
and afterwards identify the optimal financial accounting regime choice. An
optimal compensation contract solves the following problem:
max
ωˆ
0
, ωˆ
1
E
0

U
E
(V, S) AR

subject to E
0

U
M
(W ) AR

≥ 0
and argmax
e,α
U
M
(W, e, α)
Lemma 2 The entrepreneur designs the compensation contract which maxi-
mizes his expected wealth by obeying the managers’ participation and incentive
constraints:
ωˆ
1
(HC) =
β
2
ξ
δ

1 + γξ(σ
2
µ
+ σ
2
λ
)

(14)
ωˆ
1
(FV ) =
β
2
ξ
δ

1 + γξ(σ
2
µ
+ σ
2
η
+ σ
2
λ
)

(15)
Proof. See appendix.
The entrepreneur can choose between the historical cost and the fair value
financial accounting regime. If he chooses historical cost he can induce higher
eÿort and thus increase the terminal firm value. But, historical cost leads to
more opaque stock prices and thus to a lower interim stock price on average.
On the other hand, fair value accounting makes stock prices more transparent,
because all (private) information will be priced. But proving more information
will also lead to a more volatile stock price and thus the manager will demand a
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higher risk premium for her compensation uncertainty. Since the entrepreneur
is concerned with optimal motivation of the manager as well as transparent
stock prices, the accounting regime choice depends on the model parameters.
Lemma 3 The fair value (historical cost) accounting regime is beneficial, if
the following equation is positive (negative).
E
0

U
E
(V, S) FV

− E
0

U
E
(V, S) HC

=
1
2
σ
2
η
 
2c
¯
Dr −
β
4
γξ
2
B

σ
2
µ
+ σ
2
λ
 
B

σ
2
µ
+ σ
2
η
+ σ
2
λ

!
where B ≡ δ + β
2
ξ + γδξ
Proof. See appendix.
Lemma 3 shows that the financial accounting regime choice is ambiguous.
We finally use a comparative static analysis to show how the relative advantage
of a financial accounting regime will depend on the model parameters.
Proposition 1 The entrepreneur is more willing to choose the fair value ac-
counting regime if
(i) his preference for consumption smoothing (c) increases or
(ii) the risk aversion of market participants (r) increases or
(iii) the manager’s disutility of eÿort (δ) increases or
(iv) the production risk of the firm (σ
2
µ
) increases or
(v) the productivity of the manager (β) decreases or
(vi) the disutility of manipulation ξ decreases or
(vii) the accounting noise σ
2
λ
increases.
The eÿect is unclear if
(viii) the risk aversion of the manager (γ) increases or
(ix) market risk (σ
2
η
) increases.
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Proof. See appendix.
The intuition for (i) and (ii) is straightforward. As the preference for
consumption smoothing increases, the entrepreneur prefers more disclosure or
rather ecient stock prices. Therefore, the entrepreneur’s utility under histor-
ical cost accounting will, ceteris paribus, decrease in comparison to fair value
accounting. As the risk aversion of market participants increases, they demand
a higher risk premium for the risky asset. Due to the fact that uncertainty
about the terminal firm value under historical cost is higher than under the
fair value regime, the stock price will decrease relatively more in the historical
cost accounting regime and the entrepreneur is more willing to choose the fair
value accounting regime.
As we would expect, (iii) and (iv) imply that increasing disutility of eÿort
and increasing production risk make the fair value accounting regime more
favorable. As δ increases, inducing eÿort will be more costly, the entrepreneur
lowers ωˆ
1
and thus the equilibrium amount of eÿort decreases. Therefore,
using an accounting regime to assess managerial actions to induce high eÿort
will be less eÿective and historical cost accounting becomes less beneficial in
comparison to fair value accounting. The same is true for production risk. If
σ
2
µ
increases the variance of the stock price will also increase. Therefore, the
manager demands a higher risk premium and the entrepreneur lowers ωˆ
1
. On
the other hand, as the productivity factor β increases (v), more eÿort leads
to a higher terminal firm value and (interim) stock prices. The manager will
exert more eÿort. In this situation, the entrepreneur is more willing to choose
the historical cost regime to more eciently induce high managerial eÿort.
With increasing cost of manipulation ξ (vi), the equilibrium amount of
manipulation decreases. The entrepreneur responds by increasing ωˆ
1
, which
leads to higher eÿort. In this situation historical cost accounting becomes more
favorable for the entrepreneur. If accounting noise σ
2
λ
increases (vii), account-
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ing information looses the ability to asses managerial eÿort and motivating the
manager to exert high eÿort will be more expensive and fair value accounting
becomes relatively more desirable.
For (viii) and (ix) the intuition is more complex: On the one hand, as
managerial risk-aversion γ increases (viii), inducing high eÿort will be more
costly and the entrepreneur lowers ωˆ
1
and choosing fair value becomes benefi-
cial to the entrepreneur. On the other hand, an increasing level of managerial
risk-aversion will lead to a higher risk premium in the compensation contract.
Because uncertainty in the compensation contract is higher in the fair value
accounting regime, the historical cost accounting regime becomes relatively
more favorable. The aggregate eÿect on financial accounting regime choice
is ambiguous. The same cross eÿect will hold for market risk (ix). As σ
2
η
increases, the disutility of stock price opaqueness under the historical cost
accounting regime will increase. However, the fair value accounting regime
negatively aÿects the risk-sharing between manager and entrepreneur. Again,
the aggregate eÿect is ambiguous. In the next section we use observational
data to test the main implications of Proposition 1 for empirical validity.
3 Empirical Analysis
3.1 Research Design and Variable Definitions
To test the theoretical predictions of the analytical model, we need to
identify a testable functional relationship between the endogenous construct
(financial accounting regime choice) and its exogenous determinants. Also,
we have to identify suitable proxy variables for our constructs. Following
a pragmatic approach, we decide to model the following conceptual linear
functional relationship:
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fair value orientation = f(importance of equity markets (+),
management productivity (-), opportunity cost of management (+),
quality of enforcement (-))
(16)
While this approach simplifies the results of the comparative static anal-
ysis, it allows us to translate the general intuition of the model into an empir-
ical research design. The fair value orientation of an accounting regime should
increase with the overall importance of the country’s equity market. We ex-
pect it to decrease with the overall importance of management incentivization,
as captured by managerial productivity. The higher the opportunity cost of
management, the less attractive is stock-based compensation and the more
financial accounting regimes can be expected to be geared towards fair value.
Finally, the higher the quality of enforcement, the higher the personal cost
that the manager will face when manipulating the accounting outcome. Thus,
accounting-based contracting becomes more ecient.
Measuring the fair value orientation of financial accounting regimes is
non-trivial and we were unable to identify accepted measures in the existing
literature. This is why we use a set of four diÿerent measurement approaches.
First, we use firm-year accounting and capital market data to construct a
country-year level measure of fair value orientation based on firm-year level
financial accounting choices. The intuition behind this approach is that firms
are documented to follow incentives and rules when making financial account-
ing decisions (Ball, Robin and Wu, 2003). While our model only allows for
manipulation but not for managerial reporting regime choices, we think that
an empirical construct of fair value orientation should at least to some extend
accommodate the managerial discretion inherent in the financial reporting pro-
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cess. Since our first measure is based on firm reporting outputs, we characterize
it as output oriented.
To construct the output-oriented measure of fair value orientation (FV O
OUT ), we measure four distinct constructs which prior literature has doc-
umented to capture the fair value or market value orientation of financial
accounting information (Penman, 2007).
3
The first construct is the absolute
residual (|
V R
|) of the following value relevance regression (Barth, 1994; Barth,
Beaver and Landsman, 1996; Khurana and Kim, 2003), regressing fiscal year
buy and hold returns on net income and change in net income, separtely for
each country-year:
BHRET = Industry fixed eÿects + α
1
NIBE
+ α
2
DNIBE + 
V R
(17)
Higher values of |
V R
| indicate lower value relevance and thus less fair value
orientation. The second construct is the absolute residual (|
MB
|) of a country-
year regression that regresses the market-to-book ratio on total assets, leverage
and total asset growth:
MTB = Industry fixed eÿects + β
1
SIZE
+ β
2
LEV ERAGE + β
2
ASSETGR + 
MB
(18)
Again, larger values of |
MB
| indicate less fair value orientation. The third con-
struct is the absolute residual (|
GT
|) of the following country-year regression
that estimates net income on fiscal year buy and hold returns for firm-year
observations with positive returns only:
NIBE = Industry fixed eÿects + γ
1
BHRET + 
GT
(19)
3
Throughout this section, all variables are as defined in Figure 2.
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Based on the argument of asymmetric timelines introduced by Basu (1997),
we expect firms with more fair value oriented accounting regimes to report
gains on a more timely basis. So, larger values of |
GT
| indicate less fair value
orientation.
The fourth construct AFOLLOW captures the analysts following a given
firm in a given year as reported by IBES. As analysts generally state that they
prefer fair value based accounting regimes (Gassen and Schwedler, 2010), we
expect firms with a more fair value oriented accounting regime to have higher
analyst following.
Finally, the fifth construct, REPLAG, captures the delay between fiscal
year end and public disclosure of the annual report, again as reported by IBES.
As fair value based accounting regimes generally tend to require more timely
disclosures, we expect firms with more fair value oriented reporting to provide
more timely disclosures.
In order to condense these five diÿerent constructs into a combined mea-
sure of fair value orientation (FV O OUT ), we use a principal component anal-
ysis. By identifying the first principle component, we achieve two additional
objectives. First, we can check whether our constructs load with the predicted
sign, which gives us some indication about the validity of our constructs. Sec-
ond, the first principle component analysis will minimize idiosyncratic mea-
surement error of each individual construct. We use data from a total of
197,716 firm-years across 40 countries covering the time span 1990-2004 to
estimate the models (17)-(19). We require at least 10 firm-year observations
per first-digit SIC industry, country and year. To reduce the eÿect of outliers
on our country-year level measure of fair value orientation, we truncate our
absolute residuals at the 5% level. To estimate FVO OUT, we require all five
constructs to be present at the firm-year level. The resulting equation for
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FV O OUT , which explains 32.50% of the total variance of our constructs is:
FV O OUT =− 0.364 |
V R
| − 0.071 |
MB
| − 0.521 |
GT
|
+ 0.473 AFOLLOW − 0.349 REPLAG (20)
We use a normalized version of FV O OUT in our tests. We are able to cal-
culate FV O OUT for 40,460 firm-years. The average values of FV O OUT by
country and the resulting ranking are reported in Table 1, Panel A.
To balance the output orientation of FV O OUT , we use input-oriented
measures of fair value orientation. Ideally, one would assess the changing
fair value orientation of all jurisdictions’ financial accounting regimes over our
sample period. However, this approach is not feasible since information on the
time-changing fair value orientation of financial accounting regimes is scarce
and highly country-specific. Thus, we take three diÿerent approaches to con-
struct reliable input-oriented measures of fair value orientation. First, we use
practitioner publications and additional accounting literature to identify the
fair value orientation of as many national financial accounting regimes as we
are capable. To do so, we classify the accounting regimes according to the
following questions: (1) Is the recognition of self-generated intangibles forbid-
den, voluntary or mandatory? (2) Is the revaluation of intangible assets at fair
value forbidden, voluntary or mandatory? (3) Is the revaluation of property,
plant and equipment forbidden, voluntary or mandatory? (4) Is the valuation
of trading securities at fair value forbidden, voluntary or mandatory? (5) Is
the valuation of other financial assets at fair value forbidden, voluntary or
mandatory? (6) Is the valuation of financial liabilities at fair value forbid-
den, voluntary or mandatory? (7) Is the usage of the percentage of completion
method forbidden, voluntary or mandatory? For every question, we record two
points for the answer ‘mandatory’ and one point for the answer ‘voluntary’.
The sum of points across all questions divided by 14 constitutes our dependent
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variable FV O IN PL. We are able to calculate FV O IN PL for 18 of the 40
countries in our sample. The values of FV O IN PL and the corresponding
country ranking can be assessed from Panel B.
In order to gather information on the fair value orientation of more ju-
risdictions in an objective manner, we rely on the results of an online survey
(Eisenschink, 2013) where academics around the globe were asked to charac-
terize recognition and measurement rules of their respective jurisdiction. The
online survey presents information about several recognition and measurement
principles for 34 countries. We use this data to classify the accounting regimes
according to the following questions: (1) Is the recognition of research expen-
ditures forbidden, voluntary or mandatory? (2) Is the recognition of develop-
ment expenditures forbidden, voluntary or mandatory? (3) Is the revaluation
of intangible assets forbidden, voluntary or mandatory? (4) Is the revalua-
tion of property, plant and equipment forbidden, voluntary or mandatory?
(5) Is the valuation of trading securities at fair value forbidden, voluntary or
mandatory? (6) Is the valuation of derivatives at fair value forbidden, volun-
tary or mandatory? (7) Is the valuation of other financial assets at fair value
forbidden, voluntary or mandatory? (8) Is the usage of the impairment-only
approach for goodwill forbidden, voluntary or mandatory? (9) Is the usage
of the percentage of completion method forbidden, voluntary or mandatory?
Again, FV O IN SU is normalized to one by recording two points for the an-
swer ‘mandatory’ and one point for the answer ‘voluntary’ and dividing the
sum by 18. We are able to calculate FV O IN SU for 25 of the 40 countries
in our sample. The value of the resulting measure can be assessed from Panel
C.
The correlations of our three cross-country measures of fair value orien-
tation are reported in Panel D. We would like to note that the significance
level of the country-level correlations are based on very small sample sizes.
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Still, we find our measures of fair value orientation to be robustly positively
correlated. Also in line with our expectations, the correlation between the two
input-oriented measures seems to be higher than the correlations between the
input and the output oriented measures.
As FV O IN PL and FV O IN SU both lack a time dimension, we con-
struct a final input-oriented measure (FV O IN US) based on the standards
published by the FASB over the time period 1979 to 2009. While naturally,
this measure allows only for a within US analysis, we are able to study whether
our theoretical predictions are consistent with the development of the fair value
orientations of US GAAP over time. To calculate FV O IN US, we use a lin-
guistic analysis to assess the relative fair value orientation of SFASs over time.
For every SFASs, we search for the keyword ‘fair value’ and scale the frequency
counts of words by the total word count. Winsorizing the resulting by stan-
dard frequencies at the 5% level and averaging the frequencies over years of
standard publications yields the time series of FV O IN US that is reported
in Figure 1. As can be seen from this graph, the fair value orientation of US
GAAP and the relative importance of the US equity market clearly seems to
increase over time, while labor cost decreases over time.
4
We consider this as
a reasonable confirmation of our theoretical predictions.
[Figure 1 about here]
To identify suitable country-year level independent variables for our main
tests, we use data from the World Development Indicators database published
by the World Bank (2012). EQUITY CAP is the market capitalization of
the country’s equity markets deflated by the country’s GDP and captures the
relative importance of country’s equity market. Identifying a suitable proxy
4
See Khan (2010: Figure 1) for a time-trend of an output-oriented fair value orientation
measure of US banks and Emerson, Karim and Rutledge (2010) for a historic overview
about the fair value orientation of US GAAP.
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variable for management productivity is obviously problematic, since (poten-
tial) management productivity is hard to observe. We use the economy-wide
fraction of labor cost over sales (LABORCOST ) as our proxy. The rationale
for that is as follows. Conceptually, managerial output can be described as
deciding upon the relative factor usages in production. We expect the usage
and productivity of non-labor input factors to be relatively easy to observe and
verify by third parties like investors. On the other hand, labor is an impor-
tant input factor which is hard to observe, to manage and to quantify. Thus,
we argue that managerial eciency becomes more relevant in labor-intensive
production (Lieberman, Lau and Williams, 1990).
To assess the opportunity cost of managerial agents, we focus on the
income inequality within countries. As it seems reasonable to assume that
top-level management of public firms is likely to be located in the top income
bracket, the income share held by the 10% bracket with the highest income
(INC INEQ) can be regarded as a sensible estimator for the opportunity cost
of top-level management. In countries where INC INEQ is high it is likely
more costly to incentivize top-level management compared to countries with a
more equal income distribution.
As we are not aware of a specialized measure that captures the quality of
financial accounting enforcement at the country-year level, we follow prior liter-
ature (Hail and Leuz, 2006; for an overview Holthausen, 2009) in using the rule
of law (RULELAW ) indicator from Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2009)
as a proxy variable for the quality of the accounting enforcement.
Based on these exogenous variables, we estimate the following two model
versions:
DEPV AR = Yearly fixed eÿects + α
1
EQUITY CAP
+ α
2
LABORCOST + α
3
INC INEQ
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+ α
4
RULELAW +  (21)
DEPV AR = Yearly fixed eÿects + β
1
EQUITY CAP
+ β
2
LABORCOST + β
3
INC INEQ
+ β
4
RULELAW + β
5
LN GDP
+ β
6
LN GDP CAPITA+ β
7
BONDCAP +  (22)
Each model is estimated for all three cross-country measures of fair
value orientation FV O IN , FV O OUT PL and FV OUT SU . For model
(22), we add three additional control variables. LN GDP measures the nat-
ural logarithm of the annual country-wide gross domestic product (GDP).
LN GDP CAPITA reports the natural logarithm of GDP per capita. We
include these two control variables to test whether our results of model (21)
are driven by omitted exogenous variables which are linked to the overall mag-
nitude or the economic development of the respective country. In addition,
we include BONDCAP which measures the market capitalization of the or-
ganized bond market relative to the country’s GDP. We include BONDCAP
to control for eÿects of the organized debt market as we do not model debt in
our analytical set-up and we want to make sure that the importance of debt
market is not driving our results. We make no sign predictions for our control
variables.
In our last test, we use our US GAAP based time series measure of fair
value orientation as a dependent variable. Since we are basing our inference on
a simple time series of yearly observations, we try to use data for the longest
time series available. This requires us to drop INC INEQ and BONDCAP ,
since we are unable to obtain long enough time series.
5
Also note, that the
remaining two control variables LN GDP and LN GDP CAPITA are highly
5
For example, time series World Bank data about US income inequality is only available
for periods after 2000.
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correlated and thus we fear that the power of the potential regression is likely
to be very low. Therefore, we decided to estimate the following model, both
univariately and multivariately:
FV O IN US = γ
0
+ γ
1
EQUITY CAP US + γ
2
LABORCOST US
+  (23)
We use data from the ‘US Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System’ to
measure the relative importance of the US equity market. EQUITY CAP US
is market value of equities outstanding for the non-financial firms deflated by
GDP. We use Compustat to measure LABORCOST US which is labor and
related cost over net sales. Since information about labor cost is only available
for years beginning 1979, we are basing our inference on a simple time series
of 31 observations.
3.2 Data and Results
To estimate our output-oriented measure (FV O OUT ), we start with
the intersection of the Worldscope database, Datastream capital market data
(CRSP for the US) and IBES data. We include countries which have at
least 100 firms included in Datastream. Our base firm-year sample comprises
197,716 observations from 40 countries covering the time span 1990 to 2004.
Based on these observations and the methodology explained in section 3.1
we are able to calculate our firm-level FV O OUT metric for 40,460 firm-year
observations. The values of the individual FV O OUT components and the
firm-year level sample sizes per country are reported in Table 1, Panel A.
Our input-oriented dependent variables are based on fewer countries and
on actual accounting standards of the respective countries and are detailed
in Panel B and C. The country-level Pearson and Spearman correlations are
presented in Panel D. As already stated in the last section, we view the ro-
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bustly positive correlations of our constructs as evidence consistent with them
capturing related but diÿerent aspects of the same underlying construct.
[Table 1 about here]
Table 2 reports the main country-year test results for the models (21)
and (22). Panel A reports descriptive statistics for all country-year observa-
tions and Panel B reports Pearson and Spearman correlations between our
dependent and independent variables. The results with FV O OUT as de-
pendent variable are based on 495 country-year observations. When we use
FV O IN PL as our dependent variable the sample size comprises 241 ob-
servations. The results for the survey-based variable FV O IN SU are based
on 324 observations. The correlations presented in Panel B provide first uni-
variate evidence for our variables of interest. We find that EQUITY CAP
is significantly positive related to all of our fair value orientation measures.
LABORCOST is consistently negatively related only to our input-oriented
fair value orientation measures. For the other exogenous variables the results
are more mixed highlighting the importance of a multivariate analysis. The
correlations between the exogenous variables are low to moderate.
Panel C reports the model results. Consistently throughout all models,
we find a positive and significant coecient for EQUITY CAP indicating (in
line with our theoretical predictions) that countries with more influential or-
ganized equity markets choose more fair value oriented accounting regimes.
Also in line with our expectations, we find for all models a negative significant
coecient for LABORCOST indicating that countries where production is
more labor intensive (and thus managerial productivity has a larger impact on
firm value) choose less fair value oriented accounting regimes. The results for
INC INEQ, while only robust for FV O OUT and FV O IN SU , are also as
expected: Countries with larger inequalities in the income distribution are also
imposing more fair value oriented accounting regimes. That is consistent with
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the theoretical prediction that managerial opportunity cost make contracting
based on historical cost accounting regimes relatively less attractive.
We find contradicting evidence for the impact of enforcement quality
on financial accounting regime choice. While our theory predicts a negative
relation, we find for most specifications of our models a positive and often
significant relation between rule of law and fair value orientation. Thus, we
are unable to support our theoretical predictions about the eÿect of accounting
quality and enforcement on financial accounting regime choice. One potential
reason for this finding might be that financial accounting information reported
under historical cost regimes requires lower verification eÿorts compared to
financial accounting information produced under fair value reporting. While
our theoretical model assumes symmetric manipulation cost, it might be that
this potential asymmetry is aÿecting our findings.
While we generally make no predictions for our control variables, we take
interest that, first, their inclusion only has a modest impact on our coecients
of interest, and second, that the relative magnitude of the bond market has
no power for explaining the fair value orientation of our respective accounting
regimes.
[Table 2 about here]
Table 3 repeats the analysis of Table 2 using country-level data to ac-
commodate the fact that two of our dependent variables have no time-level
variance. While running the analysis dramatically reduces the degrees of free-
dom, we continue to find a generally positive relation of fair value orientation
with the relative size of the equity market and a negative relation of country-
wide average labor cost. We view this as evidence consistent with our theoret-
ical prediction that our identified main drivers of financial accounting regime
choice namely the relative importance of capital markets and managerial in-
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centivation are systematically related to the country-level financial accounting
regime.
[Table 3 about here]
This conclusion is enforced by our last test presented in Table 4. The
univariate time series results show robust positive (EQUITY CAP US) and
negative (LABORCOST US) relations to the development of fair value orien-
tation of US GAAP. The multivariate analysis shows a positive and significant
coecient for EQUITY CAP US and a negative but insignificant coecient
for LABORCOST US. We see both tests as evidence backing our results of
prior tests in the sense that they do not contradict prior findings: Over the
last decades, the relative importance of US equity markets increased and the
labor intensity of US public firms decreased. Based on our theoretical model,
this would lead us to predict an increase in the fair value orientation of US
GAAP and this is what we find. However, based on a 31 year time series we
are inherently unable to rule out alternative explanations.
[Table 4 about here]
4 Conclusion
This paper investigates determinants of financial accounting regime choice
in a setting where financial accounting objectives compete. To develop our
theoretical argument, we set up an agency model where a risk-neutral en-
trepreneur contracts with a risk-averse manager in a world with moral hazard
and private information. The value of the firm is non-contractible and unob-
servable until the last period. It depends on the eÿort level and productivity of
the manager, internal production risk and external market risk. The manager
receives private noisy accounting information about the firm value after she
has chosen her eÿort level and is able to bias the accounting report at private
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cost. The accounting report informs a risk-averse capital market with rational
expectations. The share prices of this market are used by the entrepreneur to
incentivize the agent by a linear share-based compensation contract. In addi-
tion, the entrepreneur sells a certain share of his firm in an interim period to
smooth consumption. We model the financial accounting regime choice deci-
sion by letting the entrepreneur decide between two noisy accounting regimes.
The first regime (labeled as historical cost) reports only the firm value eÿects
of the managerial eÿort and the production risk while the second (labeled as
fair value) reports the full firm value, including the exogenous market risk.
Our analytical findings indicate that, in equilibrium, the entrepreneur
will balance his two competing accounting objectives. Larger levels of risk-
averseness of the capital market or a larger preference for consumption smooth-
ing are increasing the demand for the fair value oriented accounting regime.
More productive managers shift the demand towards the historical cost ac-
counting regime. Managers with higher opportunity cost cause more demand
for the fair value oriented accounting regime. Finally, better enforced and less
noisy accounting regimes tend to increase the demand for the historical cost
accounting regime.
We test our theoretical predictions based on a worldwide sample cov-
ering 40 countries. We use input and output-oriented measures of fair value
orientation as our dependent variable. Our output-oriented measure is the first
principle component of five firm-year level financial accounting outcome-based
constructs of fair value orientation. Our input-oriented metrics are based on
the financial accounting standards of the respective countries. We use macro-
economic proxy variables indicating the importance of capital markets, man-
agement productivity, management opportunity cost and the eciency of the
national enforcement systems. Our results provide strong support for the pos-
itive eÿect of the importance of organized equity markets and the negative
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eÿect of management productivity on fair value orientation. We find slightly
weaker support for the positive eÿect of management opportunity cost on the
preference for fair value oriented accounting regimes. Finally, we find con-
flicting evidence for the impact of the eciency of the national enforcement
systems.
Our findings should be interpreted with care for several reasons. First,
our model (like every model) captures only some aspects of reality. Our ac-
counting regimes are highly stylized. We let the entrepreneur pick his ecient
accounting regime. We acknowledge, however, that in reality the financial ac-
counting regimes can be the result of a political process. We model accounting
noise to be constant across accounting regimes. Second, empirically, our de-
pendent variables are subject to substantial measurement error. We try to
address this valid concern by using multiple constructs and by using both in-
put and output-related measures as dependent variables in separate tests. This
way, we feel that we are able to triangulate the economic eÿect we are looking
for. In addition, our exogenous independent variables are noisy measures of
our analytical constructs.
Notwithstanding these caveats, our research speaks to the important
question of financial accounting regime design. It suggests and tests an ef-
ficiency based explanation for the observed international variance in financial
accounting standards. Our results are consistent with this variance being at
least partially caused by ecient regime choice due to competing financial ac-
counting objectives in diÿerent countries. Understanding the reasons for the
international divergence in financial accounting regimes should be of general
interest to academics and practitioners in the area of (international) financial
accounting.
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Appendix: Proof of Lemmas and Propositions
Proof of Lemma 1.
Because the manager learns µ and η in t
1
she expects the following stock price
in t
0
:
E
0
[S AR] =
1
1 + ωˆ
1

βeˆ+ (αˆ− α
e
)− ωˆ
0
− r
¯
DV ar [V AR]

(A.1)
The conditional variance of the stock price is:
V ar[S AR] =






1
1+ωˆ
1

2
(σ
2
µ
+ σ
2
λ
) if AR = HC

1
1+ωˆ
1

2
(σ
2
µ
+ σ
2
η
+ σ
2
λ
) if AR = FV





(A.2)
Substituting (A1) and (A2) in (5) yields:
E
0

U
M
(W, e, α) AR

= ωˆ
0
+ ωˆ(βeˆ+ (αˆ− α
e
)− ωˆ
0
− r
¯
DV ar [V AR])−
γ
2
ωˆ
2
1
V ar [S θ]
−
δ
2
eˆ
2
+
ξ
2
αˆ
2
(A.3)
Since V ar[S AR] and V ar [V AR] are not involved in the optimization prob-
lem we obtain Lemma 1.
Proof of Lemma 2.
Starting point is the conditional utility function of the entrepreneur as expected
in t
0
:
E
0

U
E
(V, S) HC

= (1− c)(βeˆ− ωˆ
0
− ωˆ (βeˆ+ (αˆ− α
e
)− ωˆ
0
− r
¯
D(σ
2
η
+ σ
2
λ
))) +
c
1 + ωˆ
1
(βeˆ+ (αˆ− α
e
)
− ωˆ
0
− r
¯
D(σ
2
η
+ σ
2
λ
)) (A.4)
E
0

U
E
(V, S) FV

= (1− c)(βeˆ− ωˆ
0
− ωˆ (βeˆ+ (αˆ− α
e
)− ωˆ
0
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− r
¯
Dσ
2
λ
)) +
c
1 + ωˆ
1

βeˆ+ (αˆ− α
e
)− ωˆ
0
− r
¯
Dσ
2
λ

(A.5)
It can be shown that E
0

U
M
(W, e, α) θ
AR

= 0 holds if:
ωˆ
0
(HC) =
ωˆ
2
δ − ωˆ
2
β
2
ξ + 2
¯
Drωˆδξ(σ
2
η
+ σ
2
λ
) + ωˆ
2
γδξ(σ
2
λ
+ σ
2
µ
)
2 (−1 + ωˆ) δξ
(A.6)
ωˆ
0
(FV ) =
ωˆ
2
δ − ωˆ
2
β
2
ξ + 2
¯
Drωˆδξσ
2
λ
+ ωˆ
2
γδξ(σ
2
η
+ σ
2
λ
+ σ
2
µ
)
2 (−1 + ωˆ) δξ
(A.7)
Substituting (10) and (A6) [(A7)] in (A4) [(A5)] and taking the first order
derivative with respect to ωˆ
1
yields the equilibrium compensation contract.
Proof of Lemma 3.
After solving the optimal compensation contract, the following holds:
E
0

U
E
(V, S) HC

= −c
¯
Dr(σ
2
η
+ σ
2
λ
) +
β
4
ξ
2δ

δ + β
2
ξ + γδξ

σ
2
λ
+ σ
2
µ

(A.8)
E
0

U
E
(V, S) FV

= −c
¯
Drσ
2
λ
+
β
4
ξ
2δ

δ + β
2
ξ + γδξ

σ
2
η
+ σ
2
λ
+ σ
2
µ

(A.9)
Subtracting (A9) from (A8) will lead to Lemma 3.
Proof of Proposition 1.
We define 4U
E
= E
0

U
E
(V, S) FV

− E
0

U
E
(V, S) HC

.
(i) ∂4U
E
/∂c = σ
2
η
¯
Dr
(ii) ∂4U
E
/∂r = σ
2
η
¯
Dc
(iii) Because δ is only a part of the denominator, it follows that: ∂4U
E
/∂δ
> 0
(iv) Because σ
2
µ
is only a part of the denominator, it follows that: ∂4U
E
/∂σ
2
µ
> 0
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(v) It can be shown that:
∂4U
E
∂β
=
β
3
γδξ
2
σ
2
η
(2δKM + β
2
ξ(2 + γξ(σ
2
η
+ 2(σ
2
λ
+ σ
2
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2
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2
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where K ≡ 1 + γξ(σ
2
λ
+ σ
2
µ
)
and M ≡ 1 + γξ(σ
2
η
+ σ
2
λ
+ σ
2
µ
)
(vi) Because M > K the following inequality will hold:
∂4U
E
∂ξ
=
1
2
β
4

1
(β
2
ξ + δK)
2
−
1
(β
2
ξ + δM)
2

< 0
(vii) Because σ
2
λ
is only a part of the denominator, it follows that: ∂4U
E
/∂σ
2
λ
<
0
(viii) Because γ ist part of the nominator and the denominator, the sign of the
derivative is unclear:
∂4U
E
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β
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η
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2
The entrepreneur is more willing to choose the fair value accounting regime if:
δ + β
2
ξ < γδξ
q
(σ
2
λ
+ σ
2
µ
)(σ
2
λ
+ σ
2
µ
)
(ix) The derivative can be either positive or negative, depending on variable
values:
∂4U
E
∂σ
2
η
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¯
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β
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7 0
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Figure 1: Time Series of FV O IN US
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Notes: FV O IN US is a time series measure assessing the relative fair value orientation of
SFASs over time. EQUTY CAP US is market value of equities outstanding for non-financial
US firms (Source: US Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System) deflated by GDP
(Source: US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis). LABORCOST US is
labor and related cost over net sales (Source: Compustat). FV O IN US, EQUTY CAP US
and LABORCOST US are scaled to one by dividing with its maximum value.
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Figure 2: Variable Definitions
Variable Definition
Variables needed to calculate FV O OUT Constructs
BHRET Buy-and-hold return over the fiscal year.
NIBE Net income before extraordinary items deflated by beginning of
fiscal year market value of equity.
DNIBE Net income before extraordinary items minus previous fiscal year
net income before extraordinary items deflated by beginning of fis-
cal year market value of equity.
MTB Market value of equity over book value of equity.
SIZE Natural logarithm of beginning of fiscal year total assets in million
USD.
LEV Debt over total assets.
ASSETGR Asset growth rate over three years, beginning with the previous
fiscal year.
Constructs of FV O OUT
|
V R
| Absolute residual of a value relevance OLS regression presented by
model (17).
|
MB
| Absolute residual of an OLS regression of market to book on size,
leverage, asset growth as presented by model (18)
|
GT
| Absolute residual of an OLS regression of positive BHRET on NIBE
as presented by model (19).
AFOLLOW Natural logarithm of 1 + the average number of analysts following
the firm as reported by IBES.
REPLAG Number of days from the fiscal year end to the annual earnings
announcement date as reported by IBES.
Fair Value Orientation Measures
FV O OUT First principal component of the following variables: |
V R
|, |
MB
|,
|
GT
|, AFOLLOW and REPLAG.
FV O IN PL Self constructed fair value score based on practitioner publications
and additional accounting literature.
FV O IN SU Fair value score based on survey results from Eisenschink (2013).
FV O IN US Time series measure assessing the relative fair value orientation of
SFASs over time.
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Figure 2: (continued)
Variable Definition
Independent Variables (Country-year Level)
EQUTY CAP Market capitalization of the country’s equity markets
deflated by the country’s GDP (Source: WDI, World
Bank).
LABORCOST Labor cost over sales (Source: Worldscope).
INC INEQ Income share of the top income decile of the population
(Source: WDI, World Bank).
RULELAW Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2009) rule of law
measure.
LN GDP Natural logarithm of annual country-wide gross domes-
tic product (GDP) in trillion USD. (Source: WDI,
World Bank).
LN GDP CAPITA Natural logarithm of GDP per capita (Source: WDI,
World Bank).
BONDCAP Market capitalization of the country’s bond markets
deflated by the country’s GDP (Source: WDI, World
Bank).
Independent Variables (US Time Series Analysis)
EQUTY CAP US Market value of equities outstanding for non-financial
US firms (Source: US Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System) deflated by GDP (Source: US Depart-
ment of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis)
LABORCOST US Labor and related cost over net sales (Source: Compu-
stat).
Notes: All variables used to estimate the FV O OUT constructs and LABORCOST are win-
sorized by country at their 1% and 99% percentile. The constructs of FV O OUT are truncated
at the 5% and 95% percentile.
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Table 1: Measures of Fair Value Orientation
Panel A: FVO OUT Measures by Country
Country N |
V R
| |
MB
| |
GT
| AFOLLOW REPLAG FVO OUT
Spain 458 0.216 0.853 0.056 2.381 97.109 0.411
Netherlands 715 0.220 1.222 0.051 2.355 101.982 0.366
US 13,474 0.252 1.198 0.058 1.760 41.354 0.307
New Zealand 98 0.209 1.230 0.066 1.730 61.776 0.166
Singapore 480 0.298 0.848 0.061 1.912 78.240 0.085
Finland 279 0.246 0.914 0.080 1.881 66.982 0.079
Japan 5,186 0.257 0.750 0.048 1.357 62.053 0.056
Canada 1,797 0.279 1.120 0.076 1.778 59.443 0.028
Belgium 230 0.180 0.803 0.051 1.725 124.683 −0.029
Australia 1,181 0.238 1.042 0.087 1.817 73.079 −0.047
Italy 591 0.225 0.859 0.064 1.956 124.509 −0.078
Malaysia 959 0.307 0.925 0.068 1.892 91.117 −0.079
France 1,690 0.238 0.941 0.054 1.876 126.388 −0.088
Hong Kong 860 0.301 0.900 0.085 2.175 102.553 −0.114
Denmark 346 0.231 0.744 0.057 1.684 115.627 −0.124
Switzerland 684 0.226 0.968 0.061 1.922 131.387 −0.131
UK 4,503 0.251 1.305 0.060 1.577 93.227 −0.143
Mexico 187 0.281 0.663 0.122 2.031 59.984 −0.161
Chile 216 0.259 0.853 0.051 1.321 92.056 −0.191
Sweden 666 0.276 1.007 0.078 1.663 85.239 −0.204
Norway 301 0.252 0.886 0.104 1.741 82.073 −0.293
Ireland 23 0.233 1.095 0.065 1.429 106.391 −0.306
Portugal 51 0.288 0.620 0.083 1.806 110.137 −0.307
Thailand 310 0.349 0.921 0.083 1.593 72.448 −0.320
South Africa 636 0.255 1.067 0.073 1.511 105.739 −0.353
India 398 0.365 1.401 0.073 1.664 90.673 −0.382
Germany 1,461 0.239 1.224 0.066 1.800 163.420 −0.486
China 405 0.368 1.144 0.067 1.461 99.109 −0.487
Austria 144 0.212 0.875 0.065 1.498 154.701 −0.515
Greece 320 0.337 1.148 0.057 1.587 176.006 −0.776
Philippines 130 0.276 0.968 0.127 1.919 139.838 −0.780
Brazil 215 0.310 0.865 0.164 1.657 75.423 −0.864
Indonesia 203 0.373 1.076 0.126 1.690 117.764 −0.936
Poland 62 0.309 0.818 0.079 1.288 161.645 −0.944
Turkey 353 0.345 1.145 0.121 1.654 128.853 −0.950
Peru 28 0.348 0.794 0.084 0.961 123.643 −0.995
South Korea 715 0.303 0.588 0.131 1.198 111.056 −1.056
Argentina 23 0.325 0.605 0.119 0.909 99.087 −1.089
Pakistan 48 0.319 0.802 0.079 1.046 164.188 −1.114
Russia 34 0.321 0.583 0.082 1.272 215.529 −1.319
Notes: This table presents the average values of FV O OUT and its constructs by country. Variables are as
defined in Figure 2. We use data from a total of 197,716 firm-years across 40 countries covering the time span
1990-2004 to assess the constructs of FV O OUT . To estimate FV O OUT , we require all five constructs to
be present at the firm-year level and are able to calculate FV O OUT for 40,460 firm-years. N is the number
of firm-year observations.
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Table 1: (continued)
Panel C: FVO IN SU measures by country
Country FV O IN SU Country FV O IN SU
Russia 0.667 China 0.333
Portugal 0.611 Japan 0.306
Spain 0.583 Poland 0.306
Denmark 0.500 Switzerland 0.306
Mexico 0.500 Finland 0.278
United Kingdom 0.500 Sweden 0.278
Netherlands 0.472 France 0.222
United States 0.472 Argentina 0.188
Canada 0.444 Italy 0.167
South Korea 0.389 Turkey 0.167
Greece 0.361 Germany 0.056
Norway 0.361 Austria 0.000
Belgium 0.333
Notes: This table details the construction of FV O IN SU . We use infor-
mation provided by Eisenschink (2013). The study presents online survey
results from accounting academics. Respondents were asked to assess recog-
nition and measurement rules of their home country. We use this data to
classify the accounting regimes according to nine questions. For every ques-
tion, we record two points for the answer ‘mandatory’ and one point for the
answer ‘voluntary’. The sum of points across the following questions divided
by 18 constitutes our dependent variable FV O IN SU : (1) Is the recognition
of research expenditures forbidden, voluntary or mandatory? (2) Is the recog-
nition of development expenditures forbidden, voluntary or mandatory? (3)
Is the revaluation of intangible assets forbidden, voluntary or mandatory?(4)
Is the revaluation of property, plant and equipment forbidden, voluntary or
mandatory? 5) Is the valuation of trading securities at fair value forbidden,
voluntary or mandatory? (6) Is the valuation of derivatives at fair value for-
bidden, voluntary or mandatory? (7) Is the valuation of other financial assets
at fair value forbidden, voluntary or mandatory? (8) Is the usage of the
impairment-only approach for goodwill forbidden, voluntary or mandatory?
(9) Is the usage of the percentage of completion method forbidden, voluntary
or mandatory?
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Table 1: (continued)
Panel D: Correlations of the Fair Value Orientation Measures
FVO OUT FVO IN PL FVO IN SU
0.547 0.206
(0.019) (0.324)FVO OUT 1
N=18 N=25
0.426 0.644
(0.078) (0.013)FVO IN PL
N=18
1
N=14
0.204 0.738
(0.327) (0.003)FVO IN SU
N=25 N=14
1
Notes: Pearson (Spearman) correlations are below (above) the diagonal and
numbers in brackets below the correlation coecients are two-sided significance
levels. Details of the variables are presented in Panel A-C. N is the number of
country-level observations.
Table 2: Country-year Analysis
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics
Variable N Mean Stdev Q1 Median Q3
Fair Value Orientation Measures
FVO OUT 495 −0.263 0.618 −0.548 −0.162 0.156
FVO IN PL 241 0.364 0.185 0.286 0.429 0.500
FVO IN SU 324 0.344 0.158 0.278 0.333 0.472
Independent Variables
EQUTYCAP 495 0.728 0.645 0.287 0.503 0.960
LABORCOST 495 0.090 0.068 0.027 0.082 0.142
INC INEQ 495 29.170 6.716 23.376 26.805 32.763
RULELAW 495 79.149 21.674 65.000 89.000 96.000
LN GDP 495 0.800 1.617 0.131 0.250 0.618
LN GDP CAPITA 495 32.123 14.712 18.743 37.612 43.467
BONDCAP 495 0.366 0.241 0.204 0.323 0.469
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Table 3: Country-level Analysis
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics
Variable N Mean Stdev Q1 Median Q3
Fair Value Orientation Measures
FVO OUT 40 −0.348 0.480 −0.721 −0.233 −0.018
FVO IN PL 18 0.361 0.182 0.286 0.429 0.500
FVO IN SU 25 0.352 0.167 0.278 0.333 0.472
Independent Variables
EQUTYCAP 40 0.666 0.526 0.317 0.496 0.847
LABORCOST 40 0.089 0.053 0.045 0.078 0.135
INC INEQ 40 29.810 6.900 24.938 27.742 33.771
RULELAW 40 74.823 24.403 55.783 86.612 95.133
LN GDP 40 0.708 1.467 0.133 0.220 0.580
LN GDP CAPITA 40 29.988 14.968 15.859 35.632 41.801
BONDCAP 40 0.340 0.221 0.195 0.304 0.426
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Table 4: US Time Series Analysis
FVO IN US
Parameter Pred
Univariate Multivariate
0.001
Intercept ?
(0.004)
0.003
∗∗∗
0.002
∗∗
EQUTYCAP US +
(0.001) (0.001)
−0.024
∗∗
−0.006
LABORCOST US -
(0.010) (0.014)
R
2
0.242
N 31 31
Notes: The table reports US time series results for 1979 to
2009. FV O IN US is a time series measure assessing the relative
fair value orientation of SFASs over time. EQUTY CAP US is
market value of equities outstanding for non-financial US firms
(Source: US Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System)
deflated by GDP (Source: US Department of Commerce, Bureau
of Economic Analysis). LABORCOST US is labor and related
cost over net sales (Source: Compustat). N is the number of ob-
servations. ***/**/* marks one-sided significance at the 1/5/10%
level.
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Mandatory IFRS Adoption, Changes in Enforcement
and Earnings Quality
Timo Eisenschink
Abstract: We investigate whether earnings quality eÿects are more pro-
nounced post mandatory IFRS adoption in countries that substantially changed
their enforcement system of accounting standards in comparison to countries
that already had a strict enforcement system in place. Using a cross-country
setting with mandatory IFRS adopters from 13 EU countries and 14 bench-
mark countries and 24,596 firm-year observations, we examine four earnings
quality dimensions: earnings smoothing, accrual quality, small positive earn-
ings and timely loss recognition. We find some evidence that adopting IFRS
within an existing strict enforcement system is associated with less earnings
smoothing in comparison to countries that substantially changed their en-
forcement system. However, we are not able to find statistically significant
diÿerences between changing and strict enforcement countries with respect to
accrual quality, small positive earnings and timely loss recognition.
Keywords: Mandatory IFRS Adoption, Enforcement, Earnings Quality, Reg-
ulation
107
1 Introduction
The international process of accounting harmonization is advancing rapidly.
Within the last 15 years more than 125 countries have decided to permit or
require the application of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS,
formerly IAS) for publicly listed firms (for an overview see Deloitte, 2013; PwC,
2013).
1
The European Parliament and the Council of the European Union
(EU) justify the IFRS introduction arguing that a single set of high quality
accounting standards facilitates the transparency and comparability of finan-
cial statements and that adopting IFRS is therefore expected to be associated
with an increase in earnings quality (EC, 2002).
Several papers investigate whether the adoption of IFRS improves earn-
ings quality. Early studies considering voluntary adopters predominantly find
positive earnings quality eÿects. In contrast, evidence for mandatory adopters
is inconsistent (for an overview see Bru¨ggemann, Hitz and Sellhorn, 2013:
12). For example, Ahmed, Neel and Wang (2012) consider firms from 20
mandatory IFRS-adopting countries and a benchmark sample of firms from
15 non-adopting countries. They document that earnings quality decreases
after mandatory IFRS adoption relative to the benchmark sample. Zeghal,
Chtourou and Fourati (2012) investigate mandatory IFRS adoption in 15
EU countries and find that firms exhibit an increase in earnings quality af-
ter mandatory adoption in 2005. Chen et al. (2010) also examine firms from
15 EU countries and report mixed results. An explanation for the ambigu-
ous evidence for mandatory IFRS adoption could be that voluntary adopters
have incentives for high quality and transparent reporting. Therefore, increas-
ing earnings quality could be shaped by incentives rather than applying IFRS
(Soderstrom and Sun, 2007; Christensen, Lee and Walker, 2008; Ahmed, Neel
1
For simplicity reasons, we refer to IFRS and IAS as IFRS.
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and Wang, 2012).
2
Another reason could be that, in addition to account-
ing standards, earnings quality is also determined by the institutional envi-
ronment. Prior literature shows that the institutional environment is more
important in determining high quality accounting outcomes than accounting
standards (Ball, Kothari and Robin, 2000; Ball, Robin and Wu, 2003; Leuz,
Nanda and Wysocki, 2003; Burgstahler, Hail and Leuz, 2006; Bushman and
Piotroski, 2006). A key institutional mechanism is the enforcement of account-
ing standards. This paper examines the impact of mandatory IFRS adoption
versus the eciency of accounting standards enforcement systems on earnings
quality.
3
European publicly listed firms have been mandated to apply IFRS in
their consolidated statements since 2005.
4
Furthermore, this shift in account-
ing rules was the cornerstone for a harmonization of EU institutional oversight
enforcement activities, because it requests EU member states “to take appro-
priate measures to ensure compliance with international accounting standards”
(EC, 2002: Recital no. 16). These mechanisms required EU countries to install
an institutional oversight enforcement system (hereafter enforcement system)
that operates on a proactive basis, uses a risk-based (in some cases combined
with a sample-based) selection technique and ensures the disclosure of de-
tected errors (CESR, 2003). As a consequence, EU countries evaluated their
enforcement mechanisms and either established new enforcement agencies or
adjusted their existing enforcement system accordingly. Christensen, Hail and
2
Capkun, Collins and Jeanjean (2013) argue that major changes in IFRS over time (es-
pecially around 2003-2005) allow more accounting choices, which explains the conflicting
result between voluntary and mandatory adopters.
3
FEE (2001: 8) defines enforcement as “all procedures in a country in order to assure the
proper application of accounting principles and standards”. Accordingly, they classify
enforcement procedures across six diÿerent dimensions: (1) self-enforcement, (2) statu-
tory audit of financial statements, (3) approval of financial statements, (4) institutional
oversight system, (5) court sanctions and complaints and (6) public and press reactions.
Note that we only consider institutional oversight enforcement mechanisms in this paper.
4
Under certain conditions (e.g. using US-GAAP) the adoption of IFRS could be postponed
until 2007 (EC, 2002: Recital no. 17).
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Leuz (2013) present an overview of countries that substantially changed their
enforcement systems: five European countries (Finland, Germany, the Nether-
lands, Norway and the UK) bundled the mandatory IFRS adoption with sub-
stantive changes in their enforcement system; and 13 countries already had a
strict enforcement system in place encompassing the requested measures and
thus no action was needed.
5
We use this setting to investigate whether earn-
ings quality eÿects of mandatory IFRS adoption vary across these two groups:
(1) IFRS adoption within a strict enforcement system and (2) IFRS adoption
and a concurrent shift from a weak to a strict enforcement system.
The probability of detecting accounting errors is higher in a strict enforce-
ment environment in comparison to a weak enforcement environment. This
suggests that managers of firms in a strict enforcement environment are more
willing to ensure a correct application of IFRS. Furthermore, IFRS requires
managers to make assumptions regarding many accounting treatments. Strict
enforcement systems reduce the set of possible assumptions and the manager
loses opportunities to exert discretion on earnings numbers. Therefore, chang-
ing from a weak to a strict enforcement system should enhance earnings quality
eÿects of mandatory IFRS adoption. This coincidence of changes in account-
ing standards and changes in the enforcement system should lead to higher
earnings quality eÿects relative to countries with strict enforcement already in
place. On the other hand, new enforcement mechanisms have to be initiated
and it takes time for firms to get used to the new process. (Bhattacharya and
Daouk, 2002; Ernstberger, Stich and Vogler, 2012). Consistent with this ar-
gument Christensen, Hail and Leuz (2013) document that most countries that
changed their enforcement system in 2005 penalized infringing firms (pub-
lic disclosure or restatement) in 2006/2007 for the first time. Hence, earnings
5
Five EU countries changed their enforcement system in 2007 or 2009 (Christensen, Hail
and Leuz, 2013; CESR, 2009).Austria has not yet established an institutional oversight
enforcement system, but decided to establish an two-tier enforcement system by the end
of 2013.
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quality eÿects of mandatory IFRS adoption should be smaller relative to coun-
tries with a strict enforcement system. Therefore, diÿerent potential earnings
quality eÿects between these two groups could explain prior ambiguous results.
Our IFRS sample comprises firms from 13 EU countries that adopted
IFRS in 2005 for the first time (mandatory adopters).
6
We only consider EU
countries that combined the IFRS introduction with a concurrent shift from a
weak to strict enforcement system (catch-up countries) and countries that al-
ready had a strict enforcement system in place before 2005 (strict enforcement
countries).
7
We also consider firms from 14 non-adopting benchmark countries.
Benchmark firms were selected based on a propensity score matching to con-
trol for firms’ incentives for earnings quality. The benchmark sample includes
Japan that substantially changed its enforcement system in 2005 but did not
adopt IFRS. This enables us to examine enforcement change eÿects that are
unrelated to IFRS. The sample period is 2002 to 2008 (excluding 2005). We
examine earnings quality along four dimensions: earnings smoothing, accrual
quality, small positive earnings and timely loss recognition.
We apply two diÿerent test designs to examine whether earnings quality
eÿects of mandatory IFRS adoption might vary between catch-up countries
and strict enforcement countries. In the first test, we investigate whether
mandatory IFRS adoption is associated with an increase in earnings quality in
comparison to the benchmark sample. Comparing IFRS and benchmark firms,
we find that IFRS firms smooth earnings to a larger extent and recognize large
losses in a more timely manner after mandatory IFRS adoption. However, we
do not find significant diÿerences in accrual quality and the frequency of report-
6
Note that IFRS was introduced in the EU at diÿerent times. For example, some countries
(e.g. Austria or Germany) allowed a voluntary adoption of IFRS before 2005, whereas
other countries did not (e.g. France and the UK).
7
Because of potential confounding eÿects, we do not consider EU countries that substan-
tively changed their enforcement system after 2005 (e.g. Sweden and Ireland in 2007) or
Austria with still no enforcement system in place.
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ing small positive earnings between IFRS and benchmark firms. Furthermore,
we compare earnings quality eÿects of IFRS and benchmark firms conditional
on the enforcement system. Therefore, we divide the full sample into a catch-
up and a strict enforcement partition. For the strict enforcement partition, we
find weak evidence that IFRS firms engage in less earnings smoothing and rec-
ognize large losses in a timely manner in comparison to benchmark firms, but
again we do not find support for accrual quality and small loss avoidance. For
the catch-up partition, we find that mandatory IFRS adoption is associated
with an increase in earnings smoothing and lower frequency of reporting small
positive earnings. Results for accrual quality and large negative earnings are
not significant. In the second test, we directly investigate earnings quality ef-
fects of IFRS firms. Thus, using only IFRS firms, we confirm the results of the
first test-series by documenting negative earnings smoothing eÿects for firms
located in catch-up countries relative to firms located in strict enforcement
countries after mandatory IFRS adoption. In contrast, we do not find signif-
icant diÿerences between catch-up and strict enforcement firms for the other
three earnings quality measures. Taken together, our results are ambiguous
and do not confirm the hypothesis that earnings quality eÿects of mandatory
IFRS adoption diÿer between firms located in strict enforcement and catch-up
countries.
In the main analysis we examine the influence of enforcement activities on
accounting choices using earnings quality attributes. Although these measures
are frequently used in prior literature, it is acknowledged that they are noisy
constructs. Therefore, we complement our analysis by a small additional test
that investigates the influence of enforcement changes on disclosure compliance
for voluntarily adopting firms in a country that changed its enforcement system
(Germany) versus a non-changing country (Austria). We find that compliance
increases between 2004 and 2008 in Austria and Germany. However, we find
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no evidence that changes in the quality of enforcement are related to increasing
disclosure compliance.
We contribute to the literature by shedding further light on the impact of
changes in accounting standards versus the eciency of enforcement on earn-
ings quality. We diÿer from other studies in two aspects: First, we use more
direct measures of accounting enforcement activities, and second, we exam-
ine the interaction between mandatory IFRS adoption, earnings quality and
changes in enforcement. Others studies that address earnings quality eÿects
of mandatory IFRS adoption either use time-invariant enforcement measures
(Cai, Rahman and Courtenay, 2008; Chen et al., 2010; Ahmed, Neel and Wang,
2012) or do not incorporate enforcement eÿects (Capkun et al., 2008; Jeanjean
and Stolowy, 2008; Zeghal, Chtourou and Fourati, 2012); thus they do not dis-
tinguish between countries that substantially changed their enforcement sys-
tem (catch-up countries) and countries that did not substantially changed their
enforcement system (strict enforcement countries). Furthermore, most studies
that investigate the link between enforcement and earnings quality use the rule
of law score (Chen et al., 2010; Ahmed, Neel and Wang, 2012), or measures
for the quality of the legal system (Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki, 2003; Bushman
and Piotroski, 2006), the quality of securities laws (Ali and Hwang, 2000; Leuz,
Nanda and Wysocki, 2003) or a mixture of the described measures (Cai, Rah-
man and Courtenay, 2008) as proxies for the enforcement of accounting stan-
dards rather than measuring enforcement per se. We also relate to the exten-
sive literature examining whether the institutional environment (e.g. strength
of the legal system, enforcement of security laws or investor protection) influ-
ences accounting behavior (e.g. Ali and Hwang, 2000; Ball, Kothari and Robin,
2000; Ball, Robin and Wu, 2003; Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki, 2003; Burgstahler,
Hail and Leuz, 2006; Bushman and Piotroski, 2006).
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This paper continues as follows: In the second section, we describe the de-
velopment of the enforcement systems in countries that substantially changed
them in 2005. Section three summarizes the related literature and develops
the hypotheses. Section four explains the research design, describes the sample
selection, provides descriptive statistics and presents the results. Section five
gives the analysis for disclosure compliance. Section six concludes.
2 Enforcement Changes in the European Union and Japan
Until 2005 institutional oversight enforcement systems (hereafter enforce-
ment systems) were not harmonized across the EU. Figure 1 gives an overview
of the types of enforcement authorities in the EU before 2005, which can be
classified into stock exchange, public authority and private authority and even
some countries (e.g. Finland, Germany and the Netherlands) had no enforce-
ment system in place. The enforcement systems also diÿered according to the
level of power attributed to the authority. Figure 2 shows that enforcement
authorities operated on a reactive basis or on a proactive basis. Additionally,
enforcement mechanisms diÿered with respect to potential penalties and sanc-
tions. For example, in some countries firms had to disclose errors and faced
high fines, whereas in other countries firms were not expected to disclose errors
or faced only low fines. In short, before 2005 (pre-adoption period) enforce-
ment systems diÿered in a variety of attributes (e.g. structure, power, review
technique, penalty and sanction) ranging from no enforcement system in place
to a high quality enforcement system (e.g. France).
8
[Figure 1 and 2 about here]
To integrate the European capital market, the EU initiated the Financial
Services Action Plan in 1999 to facilitate European investor protection and
increase competition. As one important result, all European publicly listed
8
For more information on the French enforcement system see the appendix.
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firms have been mandated to apply IFRS in their consolidated statements
since 2005 (EC, 2002). One of the goals of the mandatory IFRS introduction
is to increase cross-country comparability of financial statements (EC, 2002:
Article 1). Since merely adopting a single set of standards does not guaran-
tee a uniform interpretation and application of accounting standards (Brown
and Tarca, 2005), the regulation requests member states “to take appropriate
measures to ensure compliance with international accounting standards” (EC,
2002, Recital no. 16). The EU decided not to establish a single suprana-
tional enforcement regulator but to delegate the exact enforcement design to
national legislators. However, to assist member states with the development of
an ecient enforcement system, the Committee of European Securities Regu-
lators (CESR) released a set of 21 principles outlined in CESR Standard No. 1
(CESR, 2003).
9
The principles provide a definition of enforcement, guidelines
for selection and action techniques and requirements for powers attributed to
the enforcement agency.
10
Specifically, the principles demand proactive re-
views, the use of a risk-based (in some cases combined with a sample-based)
selection technique and the disclosure of detected errors (CESR, 2003). CESR
peer reviews show a high level of implementation in national law across coun-
tries, except for Austria which plans to implement an enforcement system by
the end of 2013 (CESR, 2009).
As Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway and the UK created new
enforcement systems or shifted from a reactive to a proactive enforcement
system, they substantially changed their enforcement systems.
11
In addition,
9
In 2011, CESR was replaced by the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA).
10
CESR also released CESR Standard No. 2 (CESR, 2004). Since this standard pre-
dominantly addresses coordination concerns such as joint meetings, it is likely to be
subordinated to the enforcement quality assessment.
11
Norway is not an EU member state but belongs to the European Economic Area (EEA)
covering the 28 EU member states plus Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway. The EEA
agreement allows the three non-EU members to access the EU internal market when they
adopt the EU capital market directives. For simplicity, we refer to Norway as an EU
member state.
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Japan tightened rules for reviewing financial statements, disclosure require-
ments and auditing in 2005 and therefore changed its enforcement system but
without adopting IFRS. In the following, we present an overview of the devel-
opment of the enforcement systems in the five EU countries and Japan.
Finland
The Finnish enforcement system was set up by the Act of the Financial
Supervision Authority in 2003. Under this act the public authority Rahoitus-
tarkastus (FFSA, Finnish Financial Supervisory Authority) became responsi-
ble for supervising the financial reporting of Finnish listed firms and began
to undertake proactive reviews at the beginning of 2005. The FFSA selects
firms using a risk-based approach based on the probability of an error and the
potential impact of this error on the Finnish capital market (FFSA, 2006).
The probability of an error is based on a risk index comprising 15 (since 2008
21) risk indicators (e.g. firms’ enforcement history, financial key ratios, busi-
ness combinations and ownership). The impact of the error is measured by
the market value of the firm. Thus, larger firms need a lower risk-index to
get under review. Based on 133 listed firms the FFSA reviewed 16 financial
statements (accounting for 12%) in 2007. In addition to full reviews of firms’
financial statements, the FFSA conducts partial reviews where it investigates
special areas of financial statements. Accordingly, in 2007 the FFSA reviewed
goodwill impairment tests of four firms and the disclosure of financial instru-
ments of 16 firms (FFSA, 2008). In 2009, the Rahoitustarkastus was renamed
Finanssivalvonta. In 2006, infringing firms were penalized (public disclosure)
for the first time (Christensen, Hail and Leuz, 2013).
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Germany
Although Germany has one of the biggest capital markets in the world,
there was no enforcement mechanism in place for a long time.
12
The German
two-tier enforcement system was established at the end of 2004. The first tier
is the private authority Deutsche Pru¨fstelle fu¨r Rechnungslegung (DPR, Ger-
man Financial Reporting Enforcement Panel). The DPR performs reviews of
financial statements on a proactive basis and uses a mixture of a risk-based
and a sample-based approach to identify firms. The risk-based approach se-
lects firms on events associated with high risk (IPO or business combinations).
The sample-based approach aims to review large listed firms every four to five
years and small listed firms every eight to ten years (DPR, 2009). In 2006, the
DPR reviewed 158 annual financial statements, which accounts for 11% of all
German listed firms. The reviews revealed 19 infringing financial statements
(DPR, 2006). At the end of every year, the DPR announces ‘examination
main focus areas’ for the following year. For example, for 2008 financial state-
ments the DPR focused their reviews on requirements for asset impairment
testing, purchase price allocation and the consolidation of special purpose en-
tities (DPR, 2007). The second tier is the public authority Bundesanstalt fu¨r
Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (BaFin, German Federal Financial Supervisory
Authority). The BaFin supervises the DPR, which, as a private authority,
does not have executive power. The BaFin intervenes if a firm is unwilling to
cooperate with the DPR or if a firm and the DPR disagree on detected errors.
Additionally, the BaFin checks that firms publish detected errors in the Elek-
tronischer Bundesanzeiger (German Electronic Federal Gazette). In 2006, in-
fringing firms were penalized (public disclosure) for the first time (Christensen,
Hail and Leuz, 2013).
12
Based on the equity market capitalization of listed firms, in 2004 (2010) Germany had
the fifth (ninth) biggest capital market in the world (World Bank, 2012).
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The Netherlands
Like Germany and Finland, the Netherlands had no enforcement mecha-
nism in place before 2005. The enforcement system was introduced through the
Supervisory Financial Reporting Act (Wet toezicht financie¨le verslaggeving) in
2006. This act equipped the public authority Autoriteit Financie¨le Markten
(NAFM, Netherlands Authority for Financial Markets) with legal powers to
monitor financial reporting of listed firms (NAFM, 2007). The NAFM started
to proactively review financial statements in 2005 and thus one year ahead of
the statutory approval. Doing so, the NAFN uses a mixture of a risk-based and
a sample-based approach to select firms. The risk-based approach identifies
accounting treatments that are expected to have a high risk. The sample-
based approach aims to review listed firms every five years. Based on 240
listed firms, the NAFM reviewed 52 financial statements in 2007 (accounting
for 21% of Dutch listed firms). The reviews detected seven cases of errors. The
NAFM has no legal power to force firms to adjust their financial statement or
to disclosure a press release in case of an error. If legal action is necessary,
the NAFM refers the case to the Enterprise Section of the Amsterdam Court
of Appeal, as happened on one occasion in 2007 (NAFM, 2008). In 2007, in-
fringing firms were penalized (public disclosure and restatement) for the first
time (Christensen, Hail and Leuz, 2013).
Norway
Until 2005 the Oslo Børs (Oslo Stock Exchange) was responsible for the
supervision of the financial reporting of listed firms in Norway (FEE, 2001).
The enforcement system included reviews in substance of financial statements.
With the beginning of 2005, the Kredittilsynet (FSAN, Financial Supervi-
sory Authority of Norway) was now required to monitor financial reporting of
listed firms and simultaneously started to proactively review financial state-
ments. Firms are selected by a mixture of a sample-based and a risk-based
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approach. The FSAN reviewed the financial statements of 31 firms in 2007,
which accounts for over 10% of Norwegian listed firms. The reviews detected
an error in one case (FSAN, 2008). In 2009, the Kredittilsynet was renamed
the Finanstilsynet. In 2006, infringing firms were penalized (public disclosure
and restatement) for the first time (Christensen, Hail and Leuz, 2013).
The UK
Enforcement of accounting standards in the UK was introduced by way
of the Financial Reporting Review Panel (FRRP) in 1991. FRRP is a private
authority responsible for the enforcement of accounting standards for listed
and large private firms. Initially it worked on a reactive basis. If the FRRP
concluded that a firm potentially did not comply with UK GAAP, it first de-
bated the issues with the management. If the parties did not reach a consensus,
the FRRP had the power to refer the case to court (FEE, 2001; Fearnley et al.,
2002). This reactive system was changed through the Companies Act in 2004
(Nobes and Parker, 2012). Now, the FRRP is equipped with more powers and
reviews financial statements on a proactive basis. Financial reports are selected
by a risk-based approach whereupon large listed firms have a higher probabil-
ity of review relative to other listed and large private firms. In addition, the
FRRP seasonally announces priority industries. From April 2005 to March
2006, the FRRP reviewed 208 annual and 76 interim financial statements and
sent 82 letters to firms due to possible non-compliance (FRRP, 2006). If the
FRRP and the respective firm agree on non-compliance, the FRRP usually
releases a press announcement. If an agreement cannot be reached, the FRRP
refers the case to court (FRRP, 2008). In 2005, infringing firms were penalized
(public disclosure and restatement) for the first time (Christensen, Hail and
Leuz, 2013).
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Japan
After infringements were discovered in several Japanese firms (e.g. Seibu
Railway), the public Financial Services Authority of Japan (FSAJ) reformed
the Japanese enforcement system in 2005 to restore confidence in the finan-
cial markets. They released several measures to enhance the quality of audits
and to strengthen and expand disclosure requirements. These measures are
intended to restructure the framework for reviews of financial documents, en-
hance auditor oversight, increase penalties if disclosure requirements are not
met, demand the disclosure of the auditor’s opinion on the internal control
system and require stock exchanges to take care of an appropriate and timely
disclosure of financial information (FSAJ, 2004). The Japanese reform aims
at improving audit quality and increasing disclosure, hereby only being partly
related to enforcement issues. In contrast, the European reforms focus on
enforcement only, regulating the institutional oversight system. However, we
follow Christensen, Hail and Leuz (2013) and consider Japan as having sub-
stantially changed its enforcement system.
3 Prior Literature and Hypothesis Development
Prior literature suggests that earnings quality is determined by several
factors. In addition to accounting standards, earnings quality is shaped by
the enforcement of accounting standards, the regulatory, legal and political
environment, other economic factors and notably firms’ incentives (e.g. Soder-
strom and Sun, 2007; Dechow, Ge and Schrand, 2010). Prior literature usually
argues that enforcement of accounting standards lowers the possibility to exert
discretion over accounting numbers and thus positively aÿects earnings quality
(Hope, 2003; Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki, 2003). However, earnings quality is
usually defined as a function of within-GAAP choices to opportunistically ma-
nipulate earnings numbers. Consequently, the link between enforcement and
earnings quality is not as trivial as it seems.
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Accounting choices do not exclusively pertain to the within-GAAP or
the outside-GAAP system because there also exists a huge ‘gray area’. Many
accounting choices require professional judgment and it is often hard to assign
a choice to one of the three areas (within, gray, or outside). Implementing an
enforcement system reduces this ambiguity by introducing a boundary between
the ‘gray area’ and the outside-GAAP area. This implies that some ‘gray area’
choices are banished into the outside-GAAP area and hence implementing an
enforcement system lowers accounting choices. Furthermore, introducing an
enforcement system increases the cost for the manager making accounting
choices that are at the boundary between the ‘gray area’ and the outside-
GAAP area. Now, the manager has to exert more eÿort to convince others, for
example, the auditor or the enforcement agency, of the propriety of accounting
treatments. Thus, borderline accounting treatments are becoming more costly
and are solely attractive to managers that have strong incentives to manage
earnings. Another aspect is that when managers (and auditors) fear that
misstatements will be detected and sanctioned, they are more likely to avoid
accounting errors or fraud.
Prior analytical and empirical evidence provide support for this discus-
sion. Ewert and Wagenhofer (2005) analytically show that limiting managers’
possibilities to exert discretion over the accounting report decreases accrual
earnings management, increases the value relevance of accounting numbers
and thus improves earnings quality. Goldman and Slezak (2006) employ a
principal-agent model where a manager has the opportunity to manipulate an
accounting report. They show that increasing penalties and detection rates
(strict enforcement) could lower manipulation behavior. However, strict en-
forcement does not necessarily ensure less misreporting if the manager has
strong incentives to do so. Empirical evidence supporting this finding is pro-
vided by Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1996). The authors document that
strong oversight mechanisms decrease management fraud actions. Further-
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more, several empirical studies point out that strict enforcement positively
influences earnings quality. Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki (2003) show a negative
association between earnings management and outside investor rights, legal
enforcement and private control benefits. Cai, Rahman and Courtenay (2008)
use a self-constructed enforcement measure to investigate the eÿects of enforce-
ment on earnings management for a cross-country setting. They measure en-
forcement by an aggregate score based on legal factors and insider trading laws.
They find that earnings management is less pronounced in countries with a
strong enforcement system. Lang, Raedy and Wilson (2006) compare US firms
with cross-listed firms. They argue that cross-listed firms face a weaker en-
forcement and litigation environment and show that cross-listed firms exhibit
lower earnings quality comparing to US firms. In addition, they document that
this eÿect is more pronounced for cross-listed firms from countries with a weak
institutional environment. Bushman and Piotroski (2006) present evidence
that a strong institutional environment leads to a more asymmetric recogni-
tion of good and bad news (conditional conservatism). Ernstberger, Stich and
Vogler (2012) examine whether changes in the German enforcement system
lead to lower earnings management behavior. They conclude that earnings
management decreases after the DPR was established in 2004. Cohen, Dey
and Lys (2008) consider regulatory changes by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX)
in the US, which increases the self-monitoring and auditing role of enforce-
ment. They show that after the introduction of SOX managers substitute
accrual earnings management with real earnings management. Samarasekera,
Chang and Tarca (2012) examine UK firms that cross-listed in Germany and
in the US between 2000 and 2009. The authors point out that the enforcement
environment improved in Germany and the US during the sample period in
comparison to the UK. They document that cross-listed firms exhibit higher
earnings quality eÿects relative to UK firms that are not cross-listed. Taken
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together, there is a wide range of empirical evidence that earnings quality is
positively linked to enforcement activities.
As discussed above, prior literature that investigates earnings quality
eÿects of mandatory IFRS adoption either uses time-invariant enforcement
measures (Cai, Rahman and Courtenay, 2008; Chen et al., 2010; Ahmed, Neel
and Wang, 2012) or does not incorporate enforcement eÿects (Capkun et al.,
2008; Jeanjean and Stolowy, 2008; Zeghal, Chtourou and Fourati, 2012). Fig-
ure 3 summarizes the results of mandatory IFRS adoption studies that use the
same methodology as we do to construct earnings attributes. For each study,
the overview illustrates findings for the individual earnings attributes: earnings
smoothing, accrual quality, absolute value of discretionary accruals (DAC),
small positive earnings (SPOS) and timely loss recognition (LNEG). Cross-
country evidence is inconsistent, showing positive eÿects (Zeghal, Chtourou
and Fourati, 2012) negative eÿects (Ahmed, Neel and Wang, 2012; Capkun,
Collins and Jeanjean, 2013) and ambiguous eÿects (Chen et al., 2010). Single-
country evidence shows either no significant eÿects (Paananen, 2008; Paananen
and Lin, 2009) or again mixed results (Chua, Cheong and Gould, 2012).
[Figure 3 about here]
We combine both literature streams by investigating the interaction be-
tween mandatory IFRS adoption and enforcement activities on earnings qual-
ity. We believe that earnings quality eÿects cannot be solely explained by
mandatory IFRS adoption, since enforcement is a key mechanism to ensure
high-level compliance with IFRS by reducing management discretion. There-
fore, we suggest that earnings quality eÿects of mandatory IFRS adoption
should diÿer between countries with a strict enforcement system in place (strict
enforcement countries) and countries that concurrently shift from a weak to
a strict enforcement system (catch-up countries). For example, assuming en-
forcement changes do not become eÿective immediately, catch-up countries
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should exhibit only marginal earnings quality eÿects. Since catch-up countries
account for for 30%-45% of prior literature IFRS-adoption sample composi-
tions, this could be an explanation for the inconclusive empirical results.
4 Empirical Analysis
4.1 Earnings Quality Attributes and Research Design
It is unclear what exactly the term ‘earnings quality’ means and thus
what constitutes a well-defined measure. Most authors argue that earnings
quality is closely linked to decision usefulness of financial accounting informa-
tion. Others believe that comparability of financial accounting statements or
compliance with accounting standards determines earnings quality. In this pa-
per, we do not take a position on how earnings quality should be defined and
about the pros and cons of the large number of diÿerent attributes (see De-
chow, Ge and Schrand, 2010, for an overview). We focus on earnings attributes
which are accounting-based since we are interested in investigating accounting
behavior rather than capital market eÿects. We believe that our attributes
are suciently valid and reliable earnings quality constructs given that they
are widely used in cross-country studies investigating earnings quality eÿects
of IFRS adoption. Thus, we use the following four earnings quality attributes:
earnings smoothing, accrual quality, small positive earnings and timely loss
recognition.
Earnings Smoothing
Earnings smoothing is the extent to which managers “reduce the vari-
ability of reported earnings by altering the accounting component of earnings,
namely accruals” (Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki, 2003: 509). The literature dis-
agrees as to whether earnings smoothing increases or decreases earnings qual-
ity. Some researchers argue that manager smooth reported earnings to either
opportunistically communicate low operating risk in order to decrease cost
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of capital or for management compensation reasons (Watts and Zimmerman,
1986; Dechow and Skinner, 2000). Following this view, smoothing behavior
decreases earnings quality. Others argue that smoothing enhances the quality
of earnings, since managers “use their private information about future income
to smooth out transitory fluctuations and thereby achieve a more representa-
tive, hence more useful, reported earnings number” (Francis et al., 2004: 972).
This paper takes the stand that smoothing behavior is a form of earnings
management and thus is negatively linked to earnings quality.
We estimate three earnings smoothing measures: (1) the variability of
change in net income (2) the ratio of the variability of change in net income to
the variability of change in operating cash flows and (3) the correlation between
total accruals and operating cash flows. For comparability reasons with prior
literature that use the same method (Lang, Raedy and Wilson, 2006; Barth,
Landsman and Lang, 2008; Christensen, Lee and Walker, 2008; Paananen and
Lin, 2009; Chen et al., 2010; Ahmed, Neel and Wang, 2012; Chua, Cheong and
Gould, 2012; Zeghal, Chtourou and Fourati, 2012), we compute our earnings
smoothing measures as follows:
∆NI = α
0
+ α
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3
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+ α
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LEV + α
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where: ∆NI is change in net income scaled by average total assets; CFO
is operating cash flows scaled by total assets; ∆CFO is change in operating
cash flows scaled by average total assets; total accruals (ACC) is change in
current assets minus change in current liabilities minus change in cash plus
change in current debt minus depreciation and amortization minus change in
provisions scaled by total assets; SIZE is the natural logarithm of market
value of equity in million USD; GROWTH is percentage change in sales;
EISSUE is percentage change in common stock; LEV is debt over total
assets; DISSUE is percentage change in total liabilities; TURN is sales over
total assets; BIG4 is an indicator variable that equals one if the firm’s auditor
is PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), KPMG, Arthur Andersen, Ernst & Young
or Deloitte & Touche; XLIST is an indicator variable that equals one if the
firm is listed on a US stock exchange; NUMEX is the number of exchanges
on which a firm’s stock is listed.
We first divide the IFRS and the benchmark samples into pre-adoption
(2002-2004) and post-adoption (2006-2008) subsamples to obtain four diÿerent
subsamples. Then, we estimate equations (1)-(4) as pooled regressions for the
four subsamples including country and industry fixed eÿects. Afterwards, we
divide each subsample into a catch-up and a strict enforcement partition and
end up with eight distinct subsamples. Then, we use the regression residuals
to calculate the smoothing measure for the respective eight subsamples. We
label ∆NI
∗
, ∆CFO
∗
, ACC
∗
and CFO
∗
as the respective regression residuals.
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The first measure is the variance of ∆NI
∗
, which displays that firms with less
smooth earnings should have more volatile net income. The second measure
is the variance of ∆NI
∗
over the variance of ∆CFO
∗
. If firms have volatile
operating cash flows this should be linked to more volatile earnings. Again, we
interpret lower values as an indicator for more earnings smoothing. The third
measure is the correlation between CFO
∗
and ACC
∗
. All correlations should
be negative and more negative values indicate higher earnings smoothing (Land
and Lang, 2002; Myers, Myers and Skinner, 2007).
To be in line with prior literature (Barth, Landsman and Lang, 2008;
Christensen, Lee and Walker, 2008; Zeghal, Chtourou and Fourati, 2012), we
apply a t-test based design to test for diÿerences in the empirical distribution of
the data. For example, when investigating for the strict enforcement partition
whether smoothing behavior decreased after mandatory IFRS adoption relative
to benchmark countries, we first calculate the earnings quality measures for
the four respective subsamples. We then employ a bootstrapping methodology
to test for statistical diÿerences. For the IFRS (benchmark) strict enforcement
partition, we first select observations with replacement and then assign them
to be pre or post. We then calculate the diÿerence of the measures between
the pre- and post-adoption period for respective partition and the diÿerence-
in-diÿerences between the IFRS and benchmark partition. We repeat this
procedure 1,000 times to obtain an empirical distribution of the diÿerences.
Finally, we use a t-test to test for statistical significance.
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Accrual Quality
Accrual quality is defined as the state of ambiguity about how accruals
map into cash flows (Francis et al., 2005). It is therefore a good proxy for the
ability of financial statements to provide decision-useful information (Dechow,
Ge and Schrand, 2010). We use an accrual quality measure proposed by De-
chow and Dichev (2002). It assesses how accruals map into past, current and
future operating cash flows. We also include control variables that have been
found in prior research as related to earnings quality attributes:
WACC = α
0
+ α
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CFO
t−1
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CFO + α
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t+1
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9
BIG4 + α
10
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11
NUMEX +  (5)
where: working capital accruals (WACC) is change in current assets
minus change in current liabilities minus change in cash plus change in current
debt scaled by total assets.
We apply the same methodology as for the smoothing measures. We first
estimate equation (5) as pooled regressions including country and industry
fixed eÿects for the four subsamples. Then, we divide each subsample into
a catch-up and a strict enforcement partition and end up with eight distinct
subsamples and measure accrual quality for each subsample as the variance of
the regression residuals (WACC
∗
) multiplied by minus one and interpret high
(low) values as an indicator for good (weak) accrual quality. Finally, we test
for diÿerences in the empirical distribution by using a t-test based design.
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Small Positive Earnings
Extant literature documents that managers try to report small profits
rather than (small) losses. (e.g. Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; Bartov, Givoly
and Hayn, 2002; Daske, Gebhardt and McLeay, 2006). We measure small
loss avoidance by an indicator variable SPOS that equals one for observations
where net income scaled by total assets is between zero and 0.01 (Lang, Raedy
and Yetman, 2003; Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki, 2003; Barth, Landsman and
Lang, 2008). We use the following logistic regression to investigate whether
firms located in IFRS countries have a lower likelihood of small positive earn-
ings (SPOS) in the mandatory period relative to firms located in benchmark
countries (First Test):
Prob (SPOS = 1) = logit(β
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Furthermore, we use the following regression to compare small loss avoidance
behavior of IFRS firms in catch-up countries versus strict enforcement coun-
tries (Second Test):
Prob (SPOS = 1) = logit(β
0
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1
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where: SPOS is an indicator variable that equals one for observations where
net income scaled by total assets is between zero and 0.01; Post2005 is an
indicator variable that equals one for fiscal years after 2005; ENFCHG is
an indicator variable that equals one for countries that substantially changed
their enforcement system in 2005 (Finland, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands,
Norway and the UK).
Timely Loss Recognition
Recognizing losses in a timely manner rather than deferring them into
future periods is an earnings quality characteristic. Prior research argues that
timely loss recognition is determined by the institutional environment and
thus varies across countries (Ball, Kothari and Robin, 2000; Ball, 2001). We
assume that strict enforcement lowers managers’ discretion over the accounting
report and thus leads to a timely incorporation of economic losses. Again, we
closely follow prior literature and measure timely loss recognition by using
an indicator variable for large negative earnings (LNEG) that equals one for
observations for which net income scaled by total assets is less than -0.20 (Lang,
Raedy and Yetman, 2003; Lang, Raedy and Wilson, 2006; Barth, Landsman
and Lang, 2008; Chen et al., 2010; Ahmed, Neel and Wang, 2012). We use
the following logistic regression to investigate whether firms located in IFRS
countries recognize economic losses in a timelier manner in the post-adoption
period relative to firms located in benchmark countries (First Test):
Prob (LNEG = 1) = logit(β
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IFRS + β
2
POST2005
+ β
3
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8
BIG4 + β
9
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+ β
10
NUMEX) (8)
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Again, we use the following regression to compare timely loss recognition of
IFRS firms in catch-up countries versus strict enforcement countries (Second
Test):
Prob (LNEG = 1) = logit(β
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4
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8
CFO + β
9
BIG4 + β
10
XLIST
+ β
11
NUMEX) (9)
where: LNEG is an indicator variable that equals one for observations
for which net income scaled by total assets is less than -0.20.
4.2 Sample Selection and Data
Table 1, Panel A presents information about institutional variables and
the number of observations per country. Our sample period cover the years
2002 to 2008 (excluding 2005) and comprises 13 EU countries that adopted
IFRS in 2005 and 14 benchmark countries that did not adopt IFRS throughout
the sample period. Because of potential confounding eÿects we do not con-
sider EU countries that substantively changed their enforcement system after
2005 (e.g. Sweden and Ireland in 2007). Information on the date of the IFRS
adoption is taken from Christensen, Hail and Leuz (2013) who surveyed na-
tional regulators and auditors from PricewaterhouseCoopers to identify coun-
tries that substantially changed their enforcement system during 2001 and
2009 (e.g. initiated proactive reviews).
13
The regulatory quality indicator
13
Christensen, Hail and Leuz (2013) did not receive survey replies for Malaysia, South
Korea and the US and thus supply no information about enforcement changes in these
countries. Based on an enforcement score by Brown, Preiato and Tarca (2013) there
seem to be no regulatory changes in the enforcement systems of those countries in the
respective period. Therefore, we decided to keep these countries in the sample.
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(measured as of 2005) is taken from Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2009).
We label countries with values above the sample median of 1.10 as having a
strong regulatory environment. The country ranking shows that in the IFRS
sample most countries (except Greece, Italy and Poland) have a strong regu-
latory environment. For the benchmark sample this is only true for Canada,
Chile, Japan and the US.
[Table 1 about here]
Financial statement data is obtained from the Worldscope database. We
exclude financial institutions (SIC-Code 6000-6799) and observations where
sucient data is not available. For the IFRS sample we delete firms that volun-
tarily adopted IFRS before 2005 and for the benchmark sample we delete firms
that did not apply local GAAP. Voluntary adopters are identified based on a
dataset provided by Daske et al. (2013). The authors argue that the classifica-
tion of the Worldscope data item ‘Accounting standards followed’ (WS07536)
contains a lot of coding errors. Therefore, they compare information from three
diÿerent sources (Worldscope, Global Vantage and a hand collection of over
20,000 financial statements) and build up a dataset that provides information
on whether a firm applied IFRS before 2005 or not.
14
We also require firms to have at least two observations in the pre-adoption
(2002- 2004) and at least two observations in the post-adoption (2006-2008)
period. This yields an IFRS sample of 12,298 firm-year observations and a
benchmark sample of 55,914 firm-year observations. We follow Barth, Lands-
man and Lang (2008) and Ahmed, Neel and Wang (2012) and use propen-
sity score matching to account for firm-level characteristics that are linked to
our earnings quality attributes. We match IFRS and benchmark observations
based on the market value of equity, market-to-book, net income scaled by
14
Note that if information on applied accounting standards is not provided by Daske et al.
(2013), we classify firms based on information provided by the Worldscope database.
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total assets and industry and yearly fixed eÿects separately for the pre- and
post-adoption period to obtain for each period an equal number of observa-
tions in the IFRS and benchmark sample. This yields a final sample of 24,596
observations.
Panel B provides the sample composition by year and by industry for the
IFRS and benchmark samples. The time and industry composition is similar
across the two samples because of the propensity score matching. The number
of firm-year observations is relatively constant over time. The biggest industry
group is manufacturing, accounting for almost one fourth of all observations,
followed by construction, with one fifth of all observations.
Table 2 reports univariate statistics for the pre- and post-adoption period
for the IFRS and the benchmark samples respectively. For the pre-adoption
period we find that IFRS firms have a higher operating cash flows growth
(∆CFO), higher cash flows (CFO), a smaller proportion of total accruals
(ACC) and working capital accruals (WACC) and a smaller likelihood of
small positive earnings (SPOS) relative to benchmark firms. In contrast, for
the post-adoption period diÿerences between IFRS and benchmark firms are
not significant for all test variables. In terms of control variables descriptive
statistics show that IFRS firms are smaller (SIZE), are less likely to be audited
by a BIG4 auditor (BIG4), are more likely to be to be listed on a US stock
exchange (XLIST ) and are listed on less stock exchanges (NUMEX) relative
to benchmark firms in the pre- and post-adoption period. In the pre-adoption
period IFRS firms have a smaller sales growth (GROWTH), issue less equity
(EISSUE) and debt (DISSUE), have lower leverage (LEV ) and a higher
proportion of sales (TURN) relative to benchmark firms, whereas opposite
eÿects show up for the post-adoption period. Variables are winsorized at the
1% and 99% percentiles.
[Table 2 about here]
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4.3 Results
First Test: Earnings Quality Eÿects of Mandatory IFRS Adoption
Table 3, Panel A presents the results for earnings smoothing and ac-
crual quality for the full sample. The results show that smoothing behavior
intensified in the post-adoption period for IFRS and benchmark firms. Fur-
thermore, results show that accrual quality increases in post-adoption period
for IFRS and benchmark firms. Results for the diÿerence-in-diÿerences analy-
sis show that the incremental eÿect of the variability of change in net income
(Var(∆NI
∗
)) is negative and significant (-0.061; p<0.01). The incremental
eÿect of the variability of change in net income relative to the variability of
change in operating cash flows (Var(∆NI
∗
)/Var(∆CFO
∗
)) is negative and but
insignificant (-0.007). A negative but significant eÿect shows up for the corre-
lation between total accruals and operating cash flows (Corr(ACC
∗
, CFO
∗
))
(-0.026; p<0.05). For accrual quality, we again find a negative but not signifi-
cant incremental eÿect (-0.001).
Since we expect that earnings quality eÿects vary between catch-up coun-
tries and strict enforcement countries, we present results for the catch-up and
strict enforcement partition, which are illustrated in Panel B. For the strict en-
forcement partition (ENFCHG = 0), we find that IFRS firms exhibit an incre-
mental increase in Var(∆NI
∗
) (0.035; p<0.05), in Var(∆NI
∗
)/ Var(∆CFO
∗
)
(0.059; p<0.01), in Corr(ACC
∗
, CFO
∗
) (0.019) and a decrease in accrual
quality (-0.007). For the catch-up partition (ENFCHG = 1), we find that
IFRS firms exhibit an incremental decrease in Var(∆NI
∗
) (-0.202; p<0.01), in
Var(∆NI
∗
)/Var (∆CFO
∗
) (-0.098; p<0.01), in Corr(ACC
∗
, CFO
∗
) (-0.104;
p<0.01) and an incremental increase in accrual quality (0.009).
[Table 3 about here]
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Table 4 presents the logit regression results for small positive earnings
(SPOS) and timely loss recognition (LNEG) of models (6) and (8). For both
earnings quality attributes we apply three separate logistic regressions: full
sample, strict enforcement partition (ENFCHG = 0) and catch-up partition
(ENFCHG = 1). All logistic regressions include control variables. Con-
sidering SPOS and the full sample regression, we find that the coecient
(POST2005 ∗ IFRS) is negative and insignificant. Thus, we do not find that
firms in IFRS countries are less likely to report small positive earnings in the
post-adoption period. The same is true for the strict enforcement partition
(ENFCHG = 0). Again, the coecient of POST2005 ∗ IFRS is negative
and insignificant. We find a negative but significant eÿect for the catch-up
partition (ENFCHG = 1). Results for timely loss recognition are similar
across the three partitions and indicate that IFRS firms recognize bad news in
a more timely manner in the post-adoption period relative to the benchmark
sample. However, the coecient (POST2005 ∗ IFRS) is only significant for
the full sample and the strict enforcement partition (ENFCHG = 0).
[Table 4 about here]
Second Test: Impact of Enforcement Changes for IFRS Adopters
To investigate the enforcement eÿect on mandatory IFRS adoption, we
partition the IFRS subsample into a strict enforcement (ENFCHG = 1) and
a catch-up (ENFCHG = 0) subsample. Table 5, Panel A shows the results
for earnings smoothing and accrual quality. Again, we employ a diÿerence-
in-diÿerences design. Results indicate that earnings smoothing increases af-
ter mandatory IFRS adoption in both subsamples. The incremental eÿect of
firms located in catch-up countries compared to strict enforcement countries
is negative and significant for Var(∆NI
∗
), Var(∆NI
∗
)/Var(∆CFO
∗
) and for
Corr(ACC
∗
, CFO
∗
). We obtain a positive and weakly significant incremental
eÿect for accrual quality.
135
In the previous tests we label Greece, Italy and Poland as a having a
strict enforcement system, although these countries have a weak regulatory
environment. Enforcement systems that operate in a weak regulatory envi-
ronment might be ineÿective. Therefore, we exclude all observations from
countries with a weak regulatory environment. This yields a subsample with
observations from IFRS countries that have a strong regulatory environment
(RQ = 1). Results are presented in Panel B. For earnings smoothing, results
are consistent with Panel A. Again, findings indicate that positive accrual
quality eÿects are more pronounced in strict enforcement than in catch-up
countries in the post-adoption period. However, the incremental eÿect is now
insignificant.
Panel C reports results for small positive earnings and timely loss recogni-
tion for the IFRS subsample and the strong regulatory environment partition.
For SPOS the coecient of ENFCHG is negative and significant in both
regressions, indicating that strict enforcement countries are less likely to re-
port small positive earnings in comparison to catch-up countries. However,
the coecient of the interaction term (Post2005 ∗ENFCHG) is positive and
not significant in both regressions. Results for timely loss recognition indicate
that firms recognize bad news in a timely manner in the post-adoption period.
However, diÿerent results for firms located in catch-up countries could not be
detected.
[Table 5 about here]
Overall, findings of the first and second test-series do not indicate that
diÿerences in the eciency of enforcement systems explain diÿerences in earn-
ings quality in the post-adoption period. Thus, earnings quality eÿects of
mandatory IFRS adoption seem not to depend on enforcement activities.
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4.4 Robustness Tests
We perform several robustness tests to verify our results. First, we rerun
the diÿerence-in-diÿerences analysis using raw values instead of residuals to
examine whether our main results are sensitive to alternative measurements of
the dependent variables (Christensen, Lee and Walker, 2008; Ahmed, Neel and
Wang, 2012). Second, we verify that the sample composition does not drive
the results. Since France and the UK (Japan and the US) account for ap-
proximately 40% of the IFRS (benchmark) sample, we restrict the influence of
these countries. Therefore, we randomly choose 500 observations from France
and the UK respectively and we additionally require the benchmark sample to
contain Japan and the US with no more than 500 observations each. After-
wards, we rerun all tests. Third, prior literature acknowledges that firms might
use earnings management during the transition to mandatory IFRS adoption
(Capkun et al., 2008; Jeanjean and Stolowy, 2008). To address this concern,
we exclude the transition year 2004 from the analysis. Results are presented
in Table 6. For the three smoothing measures and accrual quality we obtain
similar results to the results of the main analysis presented above. The same
is true for SPOS and LNEG. The regression results are qualitatively similar.
To sum up, the robustness tests support the results obtained above.
[Table 6 about here]
5 Disclosure Compliance
In the previous analysis we investigate whether enforcement of accounting
standards impact the quality of financial statements for a large number of firms
in 13 European countries. We assess the quality of financial statements accord-
ing to four diÿerent earnings quality attributes which are based on broad and
aggregate financial statement numbers. Using earnings quality constructs as
proxies for the quality of financial statements usually raises validity concerns.
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Therefore, we follow a complementary strategy by hand-collecting disclosure
compliance data for a small sample of firms that voluntarily adopted IFRS in
Austria and Germany. We select both countries because (1) they have very
similar institutional environments, (2) they have a substantial quantity of firms
that voluntarily adopted IFRS, (3) they had no institutional oversight enforce-
ment mechanism in place before 2005 and most important (4) only Germany
substantially changed its enforcement system in the post-adoption period. We
examine disclosure compliance because prior literature argues that enforce-
ment is a key mechanism to ensure high-level compliance with disclosure re-
quirements (e.g. Hope, 2003; Ernstberger, Hitz and Stich, 2012; Glaum et al.,
2013). Therefore, we expect that changes in the disclosure compliance between
the pre- and post-adoption period should be more pronounced in countries that
substantially changed their enforcement system. Thus, we expect compliance
eÿects to be more pervasive in the German subsample.
We assess compliance with disclosure requirements for the fiscal years
2004 (pre-adoption) and 2008 (post-adoption) based on four International Ac-
counting Standards: IAS 17 (Leases), IAS 33 (Earnings per Share), IAS 37
(Provisions, Contingent Liabilities and Contingent Assets) and IAS 38 (In-
tangible Assets). We selected these accounting standards because disclosure
requirements did not change during 2004 and 2008. Based on the extent to
which a firm complies with disclosure requirements related to the four stan-
dards, we construct an aggregate disclosure compliance score (CSCORE). Ad-
ditionally, we use the total number of words in the notes to the consolidated
financial statement (WORDS) as an alternative compliance measure. To con-
trol for firm-level disclosure compliance drivers, we include size, profitabil-
ity, ownership structure, IFRS experience, audit quality and US listing as
control variables in the analysis (Hodgdon et al., 2009; Cascino and Gassen,
2012; Glaum et al., 2013). We use the following regression design (including
industry fixed eÿects) to investigate whether compliance changes are more
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pronounced in Germany in the mandatory period relative to firms located in
Austria:
COMPL = γ
1
POST2005 + γ
2
POST2005 GERMANY + γ
3
SIZE
+ γ
4
ROA+ γ
5
CLOSEHELD + γ
6
IFRSEXP
+ γ
6
BIG4HAND + γ
7
XLIST +  (10)
where: COMPL is either CSCORE or LNWORDS; CSCORE reflects to
which extent a firm complies with disclosure requirements related to IAS 17,
IAS 33, IAS 37 and IAS 38; WORDS is the total number of words in the
notes of the firms’ consolidated annual report; LNWORDS is the natural
logarithm of WORDS; GERMANY is an indicator variable that equals one
for observations located in Germany; ROA is earnings before interest and
taxes over total assets; CLOSEHELD is the percentage of closely held shares;
IFRSEXP is the number of years since the firm voluntarily adopted IFRS
for the first time; BIG4HAND is an indicator variable that equals one if the
firm’s auditor is PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), KPMG, Arthur Andersen,
Ernst & Young or Deloitte & Touche (hand-collected).
Based on the Worldscope universe we identify 61 Austrian and 372 Ger-
man firms that voluntarily adopted IFRS. We exclude observations when (1)
we are unable to collect consolidated annual reports for the fiscal years 2004
and 2008,
15
(2) the 2004 annual report indicates that the firm did not vol-
untarily adopted IFRS or (3) we are unable to calculate all control variables.
This yields 30 Austrian and 248 German firms. In order to obtain a balanced
sample, we randomly select 30 German voluntary adopters. The final sample
consists of 120 firm-year observations. Table 7, Panel A shows the descriptive
statistics for the compliance measures CSCORE, WORDS and LNWORDS
15
Consolidated annual reports that could not be downloaded from web pages were requested
via e-mail.
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and for the control variables. Austrian and German firms show on average a
disclosure compliance of 75% to 80% and write on average 10,200 to 11,600
words in the notes. Univariate tests show that disclosure compliance measures
do not diÿer between Austrian and German firms, whereas both subsamples
diÿer with respect to size, ownership structure, IFRS experience, audit qual-
ity and US listings. Panel B displays changes in the compliance measures
between the pre- and post-adoption period for the Austrian and German sub-
samples. The levels indicate that disclosure compliance is higher in Germany
in the pre- and post-adoption period in comparison to Austria. In addition,
results show that that compliance significantly increases in Austria and Ger-
many over time and that increasing compliance with IAS 37 seems to be the
main driver. However, incremental eÿects of firms located in Austria compared
to Germany are (except for IAS 33) not significant. Panel C reports the regres-
sion results. Both models show a significant increase of compliance over time
(Post2005) and no eÿect for enforcement changes (Post2005 ∗GERMANY ).
Taking together, the results indicate that the level of compliance increases
over time and that enforcement seems to have no influence on that eÿect.
[Table 7 about here]
6 Conclusion
Since 2005 European publicly listed firms have been mandated to apply
IFRS. Furthermore, member states are requested to establish an accounting
enforcement system that ensures high-level compliance with IFRS. Therefore,
EU countries had to set up new enforcement agencies or had to adjust their
enforcement systems accordingly. Basically, two types of EU countries adopted
IFRS in 2005: (1) countries that already had a strict enforcement system in
place before 2005 and (2) countries that had to substantially change their
enforcement system.
140
We investigate whether earnings quality eÿects are more pronounced in
the post-adoption period in EU countries that substantially changed their en-
forcement system of accounting standards in comparison to EU countries that
already had a strict enforcement system in place. Using a cross-country setting
with mandatory IFRS adopting firms from 13 EU countries and 14 benchmark
countries and 24,596 firm-year observations, we specifically examine four earn-
ings quality dimensions: earnings smoothing, accrual quality, small positive
earnings and timely loss recognition.
The empirical analysis gives inconclusive results for our earnings quality
measures. We find weak evidence that adopting IFRS with a strict enforcement
system is associated with less earnings smoothing in comparison to countries
that changed their enforcement system. However, we are not able to find
statistically significant diÿerences between catch-up and strict enforcement
countries with respect to accrual quality, small positive earnings and timely
loss recognition. Thus, the conflicting results of prior literature cannot be
explained by the eciency of enforcement systems.
How earnings quality attributes encompass the quality of financial state-
ments is debatable. Therefore, we run a small additional test where we examine
the impact of enforcement on disclosure compliance and thus apply a more re-
fined quality construct. The test results do not support the hypothesis that
changes in enforcement are linked to better disclosure compliance.
Our results should be interpreted with caution. Earnings quality at-
tributes are noisy and we are not certain how the used variables capture earn-
ings quality per se. Moreover, the term earnings quality is not well defined
and has multiple characteristics. We investigate four diÿerent dimensions of
earnings quality. Maybe enforcement and/or mandatory IFRS adoption only
influences other earnings quality attributes. Finally, earnings quality is shaped
by a variety of determinants. We try to address this by including control vari-
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ables for firms’ incentives and a benchmark sample to control for the economic
environment (Barth, Landsman and Lang, 2008). However, we cannot rule out
the possibility that our results are biased by omitted variables.
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Appendix: The Development of the Enforcement System in France
(Strict Enforcement Country)
Enforcement of accounting standards has a long tradition in France. The
public authority Commission des Ope´rations de Bourse (COB, Stock Exchange
Commission) was established in 1967 and was responsible for the enforce-
ment of accounting standards for listed firms (Dao, 2005). The COB acted
proactively and used a risk-based approach to select firms (Nobes and Parker,
2012; Brown and Tarca, 2005). The COB had the power to force the relevant
firm to correct or restate a financial statement that did not comply with French
GAAP. However, a disclosure of the financial statement correction was volun-
tary. The COB imposed fines or took legal action if the firm did not restate the
financial statement and in cases of detected fraud. The COB reviewed 120 to
150 annual financial statements per year (Dao, 2005). It aimed to review the
140 largest firms every three years and the residuals every five years. In 2003,
the COB and two other regulation authorities merged forming the new public
financial market regulator Autorite´ des Marche´s Financiers (AMF). The AMF
is equipped with the same powers. Decisions about priority examination areas
and thus which firms will be reviewed are taken by the Secretary General, who
also appoints the people performing the reviews. This group consists of AMF
staÿ members and external auditors or lawyers (AMF, 2012a). If reviewers
conclude that a firm potentially did not comply with IFRS the case will be re-
ferred to the Enforcement Committee, which is the only institution penalizing
and sanctioning infringing firms (AMF, 2012b). In 2008 the AMF reviewed
150 annual financial, which is comparable with the pre-mandatory period level
(Berger, 2010). The French enforcement system is probably the most eÿective
mechanism in Europe as it already follows the 21 principles outlined in CESR
Standard No. 1 (Dao, 2005; Brown and Tarca, 2005).
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Figure 1: Types of European Enforcement Systems before 2005
Institutional Oversight System No Institutional
Stock Exchange Public Authority Private Authority Oversight System
Norway Belgium UK Finland
Denmark Germany
France Netherlands
Italy
Poland
Portugal
Spain
Source: FEE (2001). Please note that information on Greece and Poland are not provided
by FEE (2001). Information on Poland is obtained by an e-mail request to the Polish
Financial Supervision Authority.
Figure 2: Way of Review of European Enforcement Systems
before 2005
Proactive No Institutional
All Listed Firms Test Basis
Reactive
Oversight System
Belgium Denmark UK Finland
Italy France Norway Germany
Poland Netherlands
Portugal
Spain
Source: FEE (2001). Please note that information on Greece and Poland
are not provided by FEE (2001). Information on Poland is obtained by
an e-mail request to the Polish Financial Supervision Authority.
150
F
i
g
u
r
e
3
:
E
m
p
i
r
i
c
a
l
E
v
i
d
e
n
c
e
o
n
E
a
r
n
i
n
g
s
Q
u
a
l
i
t
y
E
ÿ
e
c
t
s
o
f
M
a
n
d
a
t
o
r
y
I
F
R
S
A
d
o
p
t
i
o
n
E
a
r
n
i
n
g
s
A
t
t
r
i
b
u
t
e
S
a
m
p
l
e
D
e
t
a
i
l
S
m
o
o
t
h
i
n
g
#
I
F
R
S
C
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
B
e
n
c
h
m
a
r
k
V
a
r
(
∆
N
I
∗
)
/
C
o
r
r
(
A
C
C
∗
,
A
c
c
r
u
a
l
S
t
u
d
y
(
O
r
i
g
i
n
)
S
a
m
p
l
e
P
e
r
i
o
d
V
a
r
(
∆
N
I
∗
)
V
a
r
(
∆
C
F
O
∗
)
C
F
O
∗
)
Q
u
a
l
i
t
y
D
A
C
S
P
O
S
L
N
E
G
C
r
o
s
s
-
C
o
u
n
t
r
y
C
h
e
n
e
t
a
l
.
(
2
0
1
0
)
1
5
(
E
U
)
N
o
2
0
0
0
-
0
7
-
∗
∗
∗
-
+
∗
∗
∗
+
∗
∗
∗
+
∗
∗
∗
-
∗
∗
∗
A
h
m
e
d
,
N
e
e
l
a
n
d
W
a
n
g
(
2
0
1
2
)
2
0
(
I
n
t
.
)
Y
e
s
2
0
0
2
-
0
7
-
∗
∗
-
∗
∗
∗
-
∗
∗
-
∗
∗
∗
+
C
a
p
k
u
n
,
C
o
l
l
i
n
s
a
n
d
J
e
a
n
j
e
a
n
(
2
0
1
2
)
2
9
(
I
n
t
.
)
N
o
2
0
0
1
-
0
8
-
∗
∗
-
∗
∗
-
∗
∗
-
∗
∗
-
∗
∗
Z
e
g
h
a
l
,
C
h
t
o
u
r
o
u
a
n
d
F
o
u
r
a
t
i
(
2
0
1
2
)
1
5
(
E
U
)
N
o
2
0
0
1
-
0
8
+
∗
∗
∗
+
∗
∗
∗
+
∗
+
∗
∗
∗
+
∗
∗
∗
+
∗
-
∗
∗
∗
S
i
n
g
l
e
-
C
o
u
n
t
r
y
C
h
u
a
,
C
h
e
o
n
g
a
n
d
G
o
u
l
d
(
2
0
1
2
)
A
u
s
t
r
a
l
i
a
2
0
0
0
-
0
9
+
∗
∗
∗
+
∗
∗
∗
-
-
∗
∗
∗
+
∗
∗
∗
P
a
a
n
a
n
e
n
(
2
0
0
8
)
S
w
e
d
e
n
2
0
0
3
-
0
6
-
∗
∗
∗
-
-
-
-
P
a
a
n
a
n
e
n
a
n
d
L
i
n
(
2
0
0
9
)
G
e
r
m
a
n
y
2
0
0
0
-
0
6
-
-
-
+
+
N
o
t
e
s
:
T
h
i
s
o
v
e
r
v
i
e
w
s
u
m
m
a
r
i
z
e
s
s
t
u
d
i
e
s
t
h
a
t
i
n
v
e
s
t
i
g
a
t
e
e
a
r
n
i
n
g
s
q
u
a
l
i
t
y
e
ÿ
e
c
t
s
o
f
m
a
n
d
a
t
o
r
y
I
F
R
S
a
d
o
p
t
i
o
n
a
n
d
t
h
a
t
u
s
e
t
h
e
s
a
m
e
m
e
t
h
o
d
o
l
o
g
y
a
s
w
e
d
o
t
o
c
o
n
s
t
r
u
c
t
t
h
e
i
r
e
a
r
n
i
n
g
s
a
t
t
r
i
b
u
t
e
s
.
F
o
r
e
a
c
h
s
t
u
d
y
,
t
h
e
o
v
e
r
v
i
e
w
p
r
e
s
e
n
t
s
s
a
m
p
l
e
d
e
t
a
i
l
s
a
s
w
e
l
l
a
s
i
l
l
u
s
t
r
a
t
e
s
fi
n
d
i
n
g
s
f
o
r
t
h
e
i
n
d
i
v
i
d
u
a
l
e
a
r
n
i
n
g
s
a
t
t
r
i
b
u
t
e
s
:
e
a
r
n
i
n
g
s
s
m
o
o
t
h
i
n
g
,
a
c
c
r
u
a
l
q
u
a
l
i
t
y
,
a
b
s
o
l
u
t
e
v
a
l
u
e
o
f
d
i
s
c
r
e
t
i
o
n
a
r
y
a
c
c
r
u
a
l
s
(
D
A
C
)
,
s
m
a
l
l
p
o
s
i
t
i
v
e
e
a
r
n
i
n
g
s
(
S
P
O
S
)
a
n
d
t
i
m
e
l
y
l
o
s
s
r
e
c
o
g
n
i
t
i
o
n
(
L
N
E
G
)
.
T
h
e
p
l
u
s
s
i
g
n
(
+
)
d
e
n
o
t
e
s
a
p
o
s
i
t
i
v
e
e
ÿ
e
c
t
a
f
t
e
r
m
a
n
d
a
t
o
r
y
I
F
R
S
a
d
o
p
t
i
o
n
a
n
d
t
h
e
m
i
n
u
s
s
i
g
n
(
−
)
d
e
n
o
t
e
s
a
n
e
g
a
t
i
v
e
e
ÿ
e
c
t
.
*
*
*
/
*
*
/
*
m
a
r
k
s
t
w
o
-
s
i
d
e
d
s
i
g
n
i
fi
c
a
n
c
e
a
t
t
h
e
1
/
5
/
1
0
%
l
e
v
e
l
.
151
Table 1: Sample Composition and Enforcement Variables
Panel A: Institutional Variables and Number
of Observations per Country
Country
Institutional Variables
Number of
Observations
Enforcement Regulatory
Pre PostChange Quality
(ENFCHG) (RQ)
EU Countries
Belgium No (0) 1.29 (1) 128 131
Denmark No (0) 1.71 (1) 192 205
Finland Yes (1) 1.76 (1) 244 249
France No (0) 1.10 (1) 1,183 1,210
Germany Yes (1) 1.42 (1) 463 507
Greece No (0) 0.88 (0) 500 561
Italy No (0) 0.89 (0) 167 169
Netherlands Yes (1) 1.70 (1) 244 228
Norway Yes (1) 1.47 (1) 226 238
Poland No (0) 0.79 (0) 170 255
Portugal No (0) 1.20 (1) 99 113
Spain No (0) 1.23 (1) 237 250
UK Yes (1) 1.58 (1) 2,177 2,152
Total 6,030 6,268
Benchmark Countries (Non-IFRS)
Argentina No (0) −0.64 (0) 24 29
Brazil No (0) 0.05 (0) 120 102
Canada No (0) 1.54 (1) 253 304
Chile No (0) 1.43 (1) 64 56
China No (0) −0.26 (0) 149 160
India No (0) −0.21 (0) 213 243
Indonesia No (0) −0.48 (0) 153 125
Japan Yes (1) 1.17 (1) 1,395 1,702
Malaysia n.a. (0) 0.52 (0) 395 403
Mexico No (0) 0.32 (0) 47 57
South Korea n.a. (0) 0.79 (0) 420 388
Taiwan No (0) 1.08 (0) 530 559
Thailand No (0) 0.41 (0) 207 213
US n.a. (0) 1.54 (1) 2,060 1,927
Total 6,030 6,268
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Table 7: Compliance Test
Panel A: Compliance Descriptive Statistics
Austria (N = 60) Germany (N = 60)
Variable
Mean Median Stdev Mean Median Stdev
Test Variables
CSORE 0.749 0.750 0.154 0.792 0.833 0.176
WORDS 10.222 9.366 4.586 11.606 10.220 7.095
LNWORDS 9.137 9.144 0.441 9.175 9.232 0.639
Control Variables
SIZE 12.291 12.319 1.499 11.459
∗∗∗
10.610 1.865
ROA 0.071 0.082 0.072 0.049 0.059 0.100
CLOSEHELD 0.439 0.505 0.303 0.320
∗∗∗
0.188 0.318
IFRSEXP 4.300 4.500 1.788 3.433
∗∗∗
3.000 1.701
BIG4 0.867 0.343 0.600
∗∗∗
0.494
XLIST 0.267 0.446 0.033
∗∗∗
0.181
Notes: This sample consists of 30 Austrian and 30 German firms that voluntarily adopted IFRS
before 2005. Based on the Worldscope universe and the corresponding consolidated annual
reports, we identify 30 Austrian and 248 German firms that voluntarily adopted IFRS. In order
to obtain a balanced sample, we randomly select 30 German voluntary adopters. The yields
a final sample of 120 firm-year observations. SIZE is the natural logarithm of market value
of equity. ROA is earnings before interest and taxes over total assets. CLOSEHELD is the
percentage of closely held shares. IFRSEXP is the number of years since the firm voluntarily
adopted IFRS for the first time. BIG4HAND is an indicator variable that equals one if the
firm’s auditor is PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), KPMG, Arthur Andersen, Ernst & Young or
Deloitte & Touche (hand-collected). XLIST is an indicator variable that equals one if the firm
is listed on a US stock exchange. N is the number of firm-year observations. All non-truncated
variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% percentile. ***/**/* marks two-sided significance
at the 1/5/10% level.
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Table 7: (continued)
Panel C: Compliance Regression Results
CSCORE LNWORDS
Parameter Pred
N=120 N=120
0.113
∗∗∗
0.573
∗∗∗
Post2005 +
(0.038) (0.105)
0.086
∗∗
0.098
GERMANY +
(0.041) (0.113)
−0.020 0.036
Post2005 ∗GERMANY +
(0.054) (0.149)
−0.005 0.179
∗∗∗
SIZE +
(0.013) (0.036)
0.322
∗
−1.187
∗∗
ROA +/-
(0.170) (0.466)
−0.113
∗∗
−0.310
∗∗
CLOSEHELD -
(0.048) (0.131)
−0.024
∗∗∗
−0.035
IFRSEXP +
(0.009) (0.025)
0.066
∗
0.100
BIG4HAND +
(0.035) (0.097)
0.137
∗∗∗
0.144
XLIST +
(0.049) (0.134)
Industry Yes Yes
R
2
0.31 0.51
Notes: CSORE is the average disclosure compliance, which is calcu-
lated using IAS17, IAS33, IAS37 and IAS38. WORDS is the total
number of words in the notes of the firms’ consolidated annual report.
LNWORDS is the natural logarithm of WORDS. SIZE is the natural
logarithm of market value of equity in million EUR. ROA is earnings
before interest and taxes over total assets. CLOSEHELD is the per-
centage of closely held shares. IFRSEXP is the number of years since
the firm voluntarily adopted IFRS for the first time. BIG4HAND is
an indicator variable that equals one if the firm’s auditor is Pricewa-
terhouseCoopers (PwC), KPMG, Arthur Andersen, Ernst & Young or
Deloitte & Touche (hand-collected). XLIST is an indicator variable
that equals one if the firm is listed on a US stock exchange. Values in
brackets are standard errors. N is the number of firm-year observations.
***/**/* marks two-sided significance at the 1/5/10% level.
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